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At the heart of the information assurance process lie
the “assurance techniques” that are used in its assessments.
Despite this, and against the backdrop of the year-on-year
annual increases of security expenditures for organisations
of all sizes, such assurance techniques remain largely
unstudied holistically to understand them and their main
characteristics, especially from the perspective of the
economics of their use. This leaves some lingering questions
unanswered: (i) which are these assurance techniques and
what are their main characteristics? (ii) how are these
techniques being used within particular assurance schemes?
(iii) how do we ensure that the increasing number of trained
professionals, products, and services in the information
assurance space are deployed and utilised in a cost-effective
manner?
This project intends to address this gap through a
comprehensive review of the use of assurance techniques
within 17 contemporary assurance schemes, and a large-
scale stakeholder-supported study including 14 interviews
as well as an on-line survey with 115 respondents on their
perception of the use and value of such techniques in
practice, in order to inform the design of future assurance
schemes.
In order to mitigate against the subjectivity over
what constitutes an assurance technique, a set of 25
assurance techniques were defined that spanned 6 categories:
Review ; Interview ; Observe; Test ; Independent Validation;
Individual Competence. Relationships between assurance
techniques were then described, e.g., where one contributed
to another.
A framework was further defined to establish criteria
for analysing assurance techniques, both independently,
and within the context of specific schemes. The
framework’s design was informed by the stakeholder
interviews. These interviews were also used to collate
scheme-specific information. This resulted in a mapping
of the usage of assurance techniques within each of the
17 assurance schemes. In order to facilitate the design of
security evaluation criteria for future assurance schemes,
a mapping was also made between the defined assurance
techniques and the security control families of ISO/IEC
27001.
An online survey was then conducted which received
responses from a further 115 stakeholders. An analysis
of stakeholder characteristics found 64% of respondents
to be security practitoners (e.g., penetration testers) and
91.81% of all stakeholders had over 5 years of industry
experience. Stakeholder representation across our range
of chosen assurance schemes was high, in particular for
ISO/IEC 27001 and Cyber Essentials.
For individual qualifications, “Oral Examination” was
perceived to be the most effective assurance technique,
with multiple-choice examination the least effective. A
further review found “Oral Examination” and “Employment
History and Qualification Review” to be the most cost-
effective combination for assessing individual competence.
An analysis of assurance techniques for assessing security
controls was also conducted. A baseline “medium” size
target was chosen for the survey (e.g., a company with
250 employees or infrastructure with 16 external IPs or
150 internal IPs). The analysis included factors such
as the number of people required, expertise required,
time required, effectiveness, cost, complementary assurance
techniques, and stakeholder confidence in their answer.
Stakeholders perceived “Penetration Tests” and “Red
Team Exercises” to be the most effective assurance
techniques, but also categorised them as “Expensive”.
In contrast, both “Review of Client-Completed Self-
Assessment Forms” and “Public Reviews” were perceived
to be the least effective, but also the cheapest to
conduct. A further analysis suggested the most cost-
effective assurance techniques to be “Architectural Review”
and “Vulnerability Scans” and “Penetration Tests”. The
least cost-effective assurance techniques were perceived
to be “Public Review”, “Emanation Security Analysis”,
“Fuzzing”, “Static Analysis” and “Dynamic Analysis”.
A case study for a “special” environment was also
described, in the form of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs).
Stakeholders interviewed as part of this process perceived
an endemic lack of security risk management processes
in ICS environments, with security assessments (where
they occurred) often providing limited assurance about
an environment’s security. In order to encourage the
development of ICS security risk management processes a
series of practical “next steps” were identified.
A high level analysis of the economics of assurance
schemes and incentives in the assurance scheme ecosystem,
which could hamper/facilitate cost-effective assurance
schemes and techniques, was also reported. A series of
assurance scheme case studies were also conducted. Notably,
this involved an analysis and comparison of the assurance
ecosystem and incentives for ISO/IEC 27001 and Cyber
Essentials certification.
Finally, the aggregate findings of the study were
synthesised and consolidated into a series of conclusions
and recommendations for improvement. This includes
recommendations for assurance technique use in current and
future assurance schemes.
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Introduction
A notable trend in the body of literature on information
assurance schemes is the focus on the operational benefits
and challenges of using the scheme, or debate on the security
controls that they outline. The assurance techniques used
in the assessment of conformance to assurance schemes
have largely escaped rigorous analysis. Where existing
literature exists on assurance techniques, the focus has
largely fallen on their role within software assurance. In
particular, assurance techniques and their use within the
Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) [4]), or in rare
cases, their use within specific product-focused assurance
schemes (e.g., the classification of assurance techniques
for use within Common Criteria [11]). The predominant
body of work in this area has been instigated by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
project, Software Assurance Metrics And Tool Evaluation
(SAMATE)1, which is sponsored by the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security (DHS). An abundance of publications
have been produced under this umbrella; notably around
the topic of source code analysis, with a particular focus
on static analysis2. A comprehensive review of existing
software security assessment tools is presented in [19],
focusing on when they can be used, their required skills,
and their benefits and drawbacks.
The role of economics within information assurance is
a small but growing area of research focus; however, the
majority of this research has focused on factors such as
incentives (e.g., [3]), and limited attention has been paid
to the economics of assurance techniques. Where this
exists, the focus has again fallen on software assurance. For
instance, [17] investigated the economic impact of having
an inadequate infrastructure for software testing and [6]
elaborated on existing approaches that are able to model and
assess the cost and value of software. The scope of assurance
techniques falls beyond software assurance, however, and
it is in this broader application that this document is
concerned: the multitude of assurance techniques, both non-
technical (e.g., interviews and observation) and technical
(e.g., penetration tests), which can be used in the assessment
of security controls (be they technical, organisational or
physical) or individual competence, and the economic
factors inherent within this.
This study is the first one to report a comprehensive
and extensive study of assurance techniques and their
economics. Figure 1 depicts a high-level overview of the
main steps of the methodology we used to produce this
report. The initial process involved information gathering
using three information sources. Firstly, publicly available
information about the 17 assurance schemes shown in Table
1 and related literature was considered. Secondly, 14
interviews with security experts were conducted to retrieve
information not publicly available, to validate information
collected from publicly available information, and to check
collected information for completeness. Interviews were also
used to study the economics, incentives, and the assurance
ecosystem, along with the ICS case study. Thirdly, an on-
















CBEST/STAR National (UK) Organisational security
CEH International Individual qualification
CESG CAPS National (UK) Organisational security
CESG CAS National (UK) Organisational security
CESG CCP National (UK) Individual qualification
CESG CHECK National (UK) Individual qualification
CESG CLAS National (UK) Individual qualification
CESG CPA National (UK) Organisational security
CESG CTAS National (UK) Organisational security
CISSP International Individual qualification
Common Criteria International Organisation security
CREST National (UK) Individual qualification
Cyber Essentials National (UK) Organisational security
Cyber Scheme National (UK) Individual qualification
ISO/IEC 27001 International Organisational security
PCI DSS International Organisational security
Tiger Scheme National (UK) Individual qualification
Table 1: Assurance Schemes Reviewed
All of the gathered information was used to: (i) define
a consistent and coherent assurance terminology to clearly
define assurance schemes, targets, techniques, evidence and
the relationships between them; (ii) define a full assurance
technique framework, including 25 assurance techniques
classified into 6 assurance technique categories, and the
relationships between them (e.g., how the outputs from some
are used as inputs to others); (iii) analyse and study the
current assurance technique landscape; and (iv) propose
recommendations for future assurance schemes.
1http://samate.nist.gov/Main Page.html
2A comprehensive list of SAMATE publications can be found at:
http://samate.nist.gov/index.php/SAMATE Publications.html
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Terminology
The use of consistent terminology aids comprehension
of meaning and facilitates the process of collecting reliable
data within the survey. However, this study detected,
through the review of related literature and publicly
available information about assurance schemes, that there
were inconsistencies and incoherences in the names and
ways assurance techniques are referred to from different
sources. Therefore, the first contribution of this study is a
terminology to describe four basic components of assurance.
Each component is described below, and their relationships
collectively illustrated in Figure 2.
Assurance Scheme. This encompasses both standards
and qualifications. For both, at least one assurance target is
set. In some assurance schemes, there are explicitly defined
assurance techniques that should be used to assess targets.
For others, these are set and enforced through an external
body (e.g., an accreditation body).
Assurance Target. An assurance target may be either a
security control (e.g., asset management) or the competence
requirements to assess such security controls (e.g., an
individual must possess a certain qualification).
Assurance Technique (also known as an Assurance
Activity). A method of assessing an assurance target.
There are two types of assurance techniques. Those which
assess security controls (e.g., penetration testing) and those
that assess the competence requirements for using those
assurance techniques (e.g., a multiple choice or lab-based
exam).
Audit and Assessment Evidence. The use of an
assurance technique to assess an assurance target generates
audit or assessment evidence. Such evidence is used to assess
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Figure 2: Assurance Activities
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Assurance Techniques
Potential variations of assurance techniques are
abundant. Therefore, the definition of a consolidated set of
assurance techniques is paramount to allow for consistency
within the survey and ensuing analysis. This study defines
25 high-level assurance techniques, which are split over 6
categories. Four of these categories represent the broad
techniques for assessing assurance targets, in the traditional
sense of a security control: Review; Interview; Observe and
Test. This is supplemented by a fifth category, Independent
Validation, which represents third-party assessment. The
final category is Individual Competence, which contains
assurance techniques that assess an individual’s competence
for using other assurance techniques (e.g., as part of a
qualification).
This set of assurance techniques must be distinguished
from two meta-techniques. The first of these is the
audit, which is more appropriately defined as a process
in which other assurance techniques are used to determine
conformance to a specification. Assurance techniques in
this context generate audit evidence. Such assurance
techniques may be used directly by auditors (i.e., one or
more individuals conducting an audit), although equally,
an auditee (i.e., the client undergoing the audit) may also
use assurance techniques, or procure services that use them
(e.g., penetration tests), for which the audit evidence may
be used by an auditor.
The second is risk assessment, which can be
broken down into the consolidated steps of: asset
identification; threat assessment; vulnerability assessment;
risk evaluation (i.e., computing a measure of “risk”); and
the recommendation of countermeasures. The assurance
techniques that we have defined here are predominantly
concerned with that of vulnerability assessment, although
some assurance techniques contribute in full or part
to the two prior steps (e.g., asset identification is a
fundamental step of architectural reviews of operational
systems, while threat assessment is explicitly defined here).
The appropriate choice of assurance techniques here is
paramount, as it is the outputs of these techniques that
provide the variables for risk computation, which ultimately
influences choices surrounding risk treatment (e.g., the
implementation of new security controls). This importance
for appropriate assurance technique choice can be extended
when examining their role in risk management, which
goes beyond the scope of a single risk assessment through
monitoring and reviewing organisational risk over time.
Controls may be implemented as part of the risk assessment
process; the level of risk, pre and post-treatment, will then
influence the choice of assurance techniques that are used
within subsequent iterations of risk assessments. Therefore,
if inappropriate assurance techniques are used it can have a
wider impact on the risk management process.
The definition of the 25 high-level assurance techniques
organised in 6 categories is provided below. Figure 3
visualises assurance techniques’ categorisation and their
relationships.
Review
Review of Documented Policies, Procedures, and
Processes - The process of analysing the documented
specifications (e.g., procedures and security properties) and
processes (e.g., managerial) for a component or system
under assessment.
Review of Client-Completed Self-Assessment Form
- An analysis of a client submitted review of their
implementation of assurance targets as set out within an
assurance scheme. Self-assessment forms typically consist of
a multitude of questions that a client must answer is multiple
choice or narrative form.
Threat Assessment - A multi-stage process used to
identify and rank the threats to computer software, a
component, or IT system. Threat analysis builds upon the
analysis of sub-processes such as asset identification and
architectural reviews against a security policy.
Architectural Review - An analysis of the components
(type, quantity, configuration, etc.) and their relationships
within a piece of software, component, or system to
determine if their implementation meets a desired security
policy.
Configuration Review - A review of the way a system
or its software has been configured to see if this leads
to known vulnerabilities. Configuration reviews can be
passive (e.g., manually checking software versions for known
vulnerabilities) or active (e.g., automated build review
scanners).
Source Code Review - The examination of source
code to discover faults that were introduced during the
software development process. Source code reviews are
predominantly manual; however, they may be supplemented
with automated techniques (e.g., using static analysis tools).
Observe
Observe - The process of watching a live, operational
system to identify real-world deviations from documented
assurance targets.




















































Optional Contributing Assurance Technique
Optional Parallel Assurance Technique
Independent Validation
Review
Figure 3: Assurance Activities
Interview
Interview - The process of questioning one or more
individuals about security-related matters within the
organisation being assessed through any medium (e.g., in
person or virtually).
Test
Red Team Exercise - A simulated attack on a system that
is given more freedom than is available during a penetration
test, in order to more realistically simulate a real-world
malicious attacker. This freedom is given in terms of the
engagement’s duration (e.g., often months in duration),
available human resources (e.g., large teams built around
individuals with different specialisms), allowed use of tools
(e.g., a heavy use of social engineering is common), and
restriction of defender knowledge to test their day-to-day
responses to cyber threats.
Penetration Test - A simulated attack on a component
or system using similar techniques to that of a real-
world malicious attacker. A penetration test may build
upon a vulnerability assessment; however, it differs in
having an implicit or explicit goal that the assessment
attempts to realise (e.g., compromise sensitive data or
obtain a certain level of network access). Typically this
requires vulnerabilities to be exploited, which would not be
undertaken within a vulnerability assessment.
Vulnerability Scan - The process of using an automated
scanner on a web application or network to identify
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vulnerabilities. Discovered vulnerabilities are not exploited.
Social Engineering - An attempt to manipulate one or
more human users into performing an action that does not
conform to operational procedures. This can be conducted
in a manner that is goal-based (e.g., access data) or audit-
based (e.g., the percentage of a department vulnerable to a
spear phishing attack).
Static Analysis - Without executing computer software,
static analysis attempts to debug and identify potential
software vulnerabilities through an analysis of its source
code. Static analyses are predominantly automated;
however, they may contain some elements of manual
interaction (e.g., in order to understand the context and
implications of the results). Human-led analyses fall under
source code review.
Dynamic Analysis - Once computer software has been
executed, this technique attempts to debug and identify
potential software vulnerabilities through active methods
(e.g., inputting unexpected data through fuzzing) and
passive methods (e.g., memory analysis).
Fuzzing - The process of injecting erroneous and
unexpected data into an input field in order to trigger faults
(e.g., crashes and exceptions) that could be leveraged to
discover software vulnerabilities. Fuzzing may be dumb (i.e.,
random) or intelligent (i.e., with a knowledge of the protocol
being tested).
Formal Verification - The use of mathematical techniques
for assessing functional properties of information and
communication systems.
Cryptographic Validation - A method used to analyse a
cryptographic algorithm and/or its implementation within
a component or system (e.g., entropy testing).
Emanation Security Analysis - One or more methods
used to assess device emanations (e.g., electromagnetic
or sound emanations) for the unintentional leakage and
disclosure of information.
Independent Validation
Independent validation occurs when a third party is used
to verify the assessment methodology of an assurance
technique, or otherwise validate the results of its assessment
of assurance targets.
Witnessed Test - The use of an independent witness to
provide a second level of verification that the results of an
assurance technique are as described.
Public Review - The process of opening a technology,
component, or system to wider review by the public.
Public reviews may be of documents (e.g., drafts of
future cryptographic algorithms) or live systems (e.g., bug
bounties).
Individual Competence
This category describes assurance techniques that assess
an individual’s competency for using other assurance
techniques.
Virtual Lab Examination - The use of a virtual lab
environment to simulate real-world scenarios for testing a
candidate’s competence.
Oral Examination (Viva Voce) - The process of
questioning and answering using spoken word to determine
a candidates competence.
Paper-Based Examination (Narrative Form) - An
assessment that uses exam papers where questions must be
answered in an essay style (i.e., written as a narrative).
Paper-Based Examination (Multiple-Choice - An
assessment that uses exam papers where questions have
multiple pre-prepared answers, of which the candidate must
select one or a subset.
Employment History and Qualification Review - A
review of the work history and experience of an individual.
This includes the validation of pre-requisite qualifications.
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Use of Assurance Techniques within
Assurance Schemes
To further understand how assurance techniques are used
in practice, it is required to study the role they play in
particular assurance schemes. In this section, a descriptive
analysis of the use of assurance techniques within assurance
schemes is performed. Data for this was collected through
an in-depth review of publicly available information about
the 17 assurance schemes mentioned earlier, and targeted
interviews to confirm and/or complete missing/incomplete
information.
For each of the 25 assurance techniques, data was
gathered about which of the 17 assurance schemes uses
them. Then, for each assurance technique within each
assurance scheme, the following data was gathered:
• Intended Outcome: A qualitative description of what
an assurance technique is intended to achieve for a
particular assurance scheme and how the results are
reported (e.g., pass or fail for an examination, or the
choice of metrics to report vulnerabilities).
• Lifecycle Stage: The stage of a component or
system’s lifecycle in which an assurance technique is
predominantly used. Five criteria are outlined:
• Pre-Deployment - Before a component or system has
been put into an operational environment.
• Operational - Once the system is live.
• Acquisition - An assessment prior, during, or after
a component or system has been procured, but
before it is deployed operationally by the purchasing
organisation.
• End of Life - When a system is being is being removed
from active use.
• N/A - Not applicable (e.g., for assurance techniques
that assess individual competence).
• Qualifications and/or Certifications needed: The
required prerequisites to be allowed to conduct an
assurance technique. These can be applied at two levels:
that of the individual (e.g., personal qualifications or
security clearance) or that of the organisation (e.g., to
be a certification body or other “approved” company).
• Sensitivity of Input Material: This study uses the
data classifications mentioned below and outlined by
the UK Cabinet Office’s 2013 publication, “Government
Security Classifications” [18] (readers are referred to the







• Extent of Contribution: Three criteria are defined to
determine a level of extent that an assurance technique
contributes to the collective assurance targets set out by
an assurance scheme.
1. Xsig - An assurance technique is mandatory and its
contribution to the scheme is significant. The term
significant is qualified as an assurance technique
that provides assessment to a large proportion of
security controls or requirements, or any assurance
technique that is a necessary prerequisite to another
Xsig activity, regardless of the proportion of
security controls and requirements assessed.
2. Xmin - An assurance technique is mandatory;
however, it’s contribution to the scheme in minor.
The term minor is qualified as an assurance
technique that is only applicable to the assessment
of a small proportion of security controls or
requirements, and is not a necessary prerequisite
to an Xsig assurance technique.
3. Xop - An assurance technique is suggested, but an
alternative could be used in its place to assess the
outlined security controls and requirements.
Appendix A: Assurance Technique Characteristics per
Assurance Scheme details all the results obtained. The
criteria represent the columns, and each row describes the
characteristics of an assurance technique within the context
of a particular scheme. A tabular approach enables ease
of analysis, and if interactive, the sorting and filtering by
particular characteristics. Such functionality enables it to
serve as a valuable descriptive resource on the contemporary
usage of assurance techniques, both for the design of
future schemes, and if in the public domain, those wishing
to procure assurance techniques for use within assurance
schemes.
Next, a high level analysis of the table in Appendix A is
reported. First, Figure 4 lists all the assurance techniques
and how often they are used within assurance schemes (only
reported values where explicit mentions of use of assurance
technique was found within an assurance scheme). It can be
seen that Review of Documented Policies, Procedures and
Processes was found to be the most widely used assurance
technique across all the organisational security schemes that
were surveyed during this research. On the other hand, none
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of the assurance schemes reviewed included Static Analysis,
Dynamic Analysis and Public Reviews.
Figure 4: Number of Assurance Schemes in which each
Assurance Technique is employed.
Having a closer look at individual variables reported
in Appendix A, the intended outcome variable contains
a qualitative description of what the technique is aiming
to achieve for that particular assurance scheme. This
information is important to contextualize the effectiveness of
any technique, as the effectiveness of an assurance technique
is perceived with respect to its intended outcome. It can be
seen that the intended outcome of the assurance technique
often depends on the assurance scheme it is employed in.
For example, Review of Documented Policies, Procedures
and Processes is used to perform an assessment statement
to outline risks and recommendations when it is used as
part of the CESG Tailored Assurance Scheme (CTAS).
On the other hand, it is used ensure compliance with
established standards and provide audit trails for other
assurance schemes like ISO/IEC 27001 and CESG Assured
Services (CAS). Thus, the same technique can be used for
different objectives depending on the assurance scheme.
An interesting observation regarding the Lifecycle stage
is that most techniques are used for Operational
systems regardless of the assurance scheme they are used
in. One notable exception to this is the Common Criteria
assurance scheme. It can be seen from the table that
assurance techniques like Review of Documented Policies,
Procedures and Processes, Source Code Review, Penetration
Testing, Vulnerability Scans and Cryptographic Validation
are used in the Pre-Deployment phase even though they
are used for Operational systems when employed in other
assurance schemes.
Regarding extent of contribution, a general observation
is that most assurance techniques that are explicitly
mentioned to be used within particular assurance schemes
are mandatory and its contribution to the scheme is
significant (Xsig). There are only few exceptions to this (16
out 92 cases), in which assurance techniques were deemed
to be either mandatory but with a minor contribution
(7 cases) or were optional (9 cases). Notable cases were
those of Penetration Testing and Vulnerability Scans, which
are both optional in ISO/IEC 27001, yet they were rated
among the most cost-effective assurance techniques by the
security practitioners that filled out the aforementioned
on-line survey. Another interesting observation is that
an assurance technique can be a significant part of an
assessment for a particular assurance scheme while it may be
optional for an assessment for a different assurance scheme.
For example, Source Code Review are mandatory and a
significant part of a Common Criteria evaluation but they
are an optional part of a CTAS evaluation and they may or
may not be employed. Moreover, in other assurance schemes
such as PCI DSS, for example, Source Code Reviews are not
employed at all.
Assurance Techniques and Security Controls
Assurance schemes like Cyber Essentials clearly dictate the
assurance technique to be used to assess the security controls
it mandates (e.g., review of self-assessment forms to check
the 5 Cyber Essentials security controls). However, there
are many other assurance schemes in which this is unclear.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of an assurance technique is
obviously relational to the security control (i.e., assurance
target) in which it is assessing.
A preliminary mapping of assurance techniques to the
high-level security families of ISO/IEC 27001 has been
produced. It is believed that such a mapping will
aid in the development of compliance evaluation criteria
for the security controls outlined in future assurance
schemes. ISO/IEC 27001 was chosen due to its widespread
international adoption and position as the de facto MSS
for information security, and the frequent use as a baseline
for other assurance schemes. However, there are mappings
of ISO/IEC 27001 to other schemes, like Appendix H of
[14], which is a mapping between the security controls of
ISO/IEC 27001 to NIST 800-53, and then from NIST 800-
53 to ISO/IEC 15408 (Common Criteria).
Appendix B: Mapping of Assurance Techniques to
Assurance Controls outlines the mapping between 20
assurance techniques and the 35 ISO/IEC 27001 (Annex
A) control families. Assurance techniques within ISO/IEC
27001 broadly fall into two categories: First, those used or
procured (from a third party) by a client (i.e., the auditee)
which generate audit evidence. Second, those used by an
auditor. In some cases, assurance techniques may bridge the
two categories (e.g., for internal audits). It is important to
clarify for the reader, that in standards such as ISO/IEC
27001, auditors are free to use any assurance technique
The Economics of Assurance Activities — Security Lancaster Page 8 of 44
they deem adequate for assessing an assurance scheme’s
requirement, although exceptions to this occur in other
schemes, where particular requirements mandate certain
assurance techniques be used in their assessments for certain
security controls (e.g., in PCI DSS).
The following mapping is not intended to dictate
assurance technique usage in either category. Instead, it
is intended to provide guidelines on the most appropriate
assurance techniques for particular security controls, with
the intention of facilitating the design of security evaluation
criteria for future assurance schemes. To provide a robust
framework for this analysis, a set of principles was defined.
Core Principle: An assurance technique contributes
directly to an audit and is conducted by the auditor, or the
assurance technique is used by the auditee or a third-party
to generate audit evidence. Sub-principles:
1. Where possible, assurance technique usage is pragmatic
(i.e., they provide a valid contribution, or can be seen to
provide one in the design of future assurance schemes,
while ignoring “potential” or “abstract” inclusions).
2. An assurance technique may provide audit evidence
while not being a direct assessment of a security
control. An example is a threat assessment. This may
include the definition of organisational requirements
and identification of assets, which can contribute to
control families such as “A.6.1 Internal Organisation”.
3. Relationships between assurance techniques were
defined in Figure 2. If an assurance technique
is set which has “optional contributing” assurance
techniques, it does not mean they also must be enabled
in this mapping, and vice versa. An example is
penetration testing, where multiple sub-techniques can
contribute, and may or may not be used depending on
the assessor.
4. Assurance techniques are associated with control
families, based upon their potential to assess that
control family. A more granular level of effectiveness
exists beyond this; the mapping does not dictate
that two assurance techniques are equally effective for
assessing that control family.
A preliminary review of the quantity of assurance
techniques within each control family was conducted. A
table representing these figures can also be found in
Appendix B: Mapping of Assurance Techniques to Assurance
Controls. The table shows a clear trend in the range of 5
to 10 assurance techniques. A qualitative review of these
assurance techniques demonstrates the dominance of the
“big three” audit techniques (review, interview, observe).
This, however, is not surprising given that ISO/IEC 27001
is used to enforce an ISMS, where processes reign over the
specifics of security controls. For the control families at
the higher end of this range, we begin to see greater use of
assurance techniques where an element of user behaviour is
considered in the security controls contained. For example,
social engineering appears frequently here. Control families
where there are technical controls (a minority) there is as
would be expected, a large number of assurance techniques
that could potentially be used in their assessment; however,
contraints of real-world environments may restrict the use
of some of these (e.g., due to closed source software).
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Perceptions of Assurance Techniques
Expert knowledge from 115 security professionals was
gathered via an on-line survey focusing on economic-related
variables, including experts’ perceptions of requirements
(number of people, expertise, and time) and cost to
conduct each assurance technique as well as effectiveness
and complementary assurance techniques. Note that these
variables can largely vary depending on the assurance target
being assessed. Indeed, many of the techniques depend on
the nature and size of the organization to be assessed, the
environment and conditions of evaluation, etc.
In order to enable meaningful comparisons across
techniques and with a view to maximising fairness of any
such comparison, survey respondents where suggested to
consider a commercial medium-size scenario for all assurance
techniques as follows:
“For each assurance technique, assume a commercial
target of medium size. Examples: company with 250
employees; infrastructure with 16 external IPs or 150
internal IPs; web application with one database and 100
static or dynamic pages; product like a Firewall, Router or
Switch.”
Stakeholder Composition
Primary Role: Figure 5 shows the distribution of the
different roles that the respondents of the survey have in
their day to day jobs. As can be seen from the figure, 64% of
respondents in our sample are Security Practitioners. This
is an advantage for our research as the practitioners actually
perform the assurance techniques, which are analyzed in
this project, and have a fair idea about how they work and
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qualifications)
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Security Practitioner (e.g: a
penetration tester, security
architect)
Figure 5: Primary Role of Survey Participants
Assurance Experience: Figure 6 shows the number of
years respondents spent in the information security industry.
Notably, 56,45% respondents have spent over 15 years















Figure 6: Number of years spent in security industry
Assurance Schemes: Respondents were also asked about
the assurance schemes they are involved in their day-to-day
role. Figure 7 shows the results. As can be seen in the figure,
we found a reasonably large variety of assurance schemes
that the respondents are familiar with, covering most of the


















Figure 7: Assurance Schemes
Individual Qualifications: Figure 8 shows the number
of instances of each of the individual qualifications
encountered. It is to be noted here that the total number
of responses to this question is more than the total
number of respondents, because respondents were allowed























Figure 8: Individual Qualifications
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Confidence Level: Respondents were asked to select
their level of confidence in the answers they provided for each
of the assurance technique. The results are shown in Table 2.
The respondents were able to select 3 levels, namely, Low,
Medium and High. Architectural Reviews and Penetration
Testing have been found to be the two assurance techniques
where the highest proportion of respondents answered with
High level of confidence (62% and 61% respectively).
Assurance Technique Confidence Level Total
Low Med High Resp.
Review of Policies, etc. 4% 40% 56% 72
Review of Client Forms 16% 53% 31% 64
Architectural Review - 38% 62% 64
Configuration Review 6% 55% 39% 56
Source Code Review 18% 47% 35% 49
Observation 12% 64% 24% 41
Interviews 9% 41% 50% 54
Red Team Exercises 7% 52% 41% 42
Penetration Tests 5% 34% 61% 56
Vulnerability Scan 7% 42% 51% 55
Social Engineering 25% 40% 35% 40
Threat Assessment 4% 46% 50% 54
Static Analysis 30% 67% 3% 30
Dynamic Analysis 28% 65% 7% 29
Fuzzing 41% 48% 11% 27
Formal Verification 16% 53% 31% 32
Cryptographic Validation 26% 52% 22% 31
Emanation Security Analysis 35% 54% 11% 26
Witnessed Test 10% 63% 27% 30
Public Review 46% 46% 8% 26
Table 2: Confidence of respondents in their input
Assurance Techniques Characteristics
Assurance Technique Number of People Total
1 2 3 4+ Resp.
Review of Policies 54% 37% 8% 1% 73
Review of Client Forms 81% 13% 3% 3% 64
Architectural Review 74% 17% 6% 3% 64
Configuration Review 61% 30% 5% 4% 57
Source Code Review 43% 33% 10% 15% 49
Observation 61% 32% 5% 2% 41
Interviews 35% 56% 9% - 54
Red Team Exercises 11% 30% 28% 31% 43
Penetration Tests 18% 64% 16% 2% 56
Vulnerability Scan 80% 16% 4% - 55
Social Engineering 40% 42% 5% 13% 40
Threat Assessment 72% 22% 2% 4% 54
Static Analysis 70% 20% 7% 3% 30
Dynamic Analysis 62% 24% 7% 7% 29
Fuzzing 66% 26% - 8% 27
Formal Verification 31% 41% 13% 15% 32
Cryptographic Validation 58% 26% 7% 9% 31
Emanation Sec. Analysis 46% 46% 8% - 26
Witnessed Test 50% 33% 17% - 30
Public Review 48% 28% 8% 16% 25
Table 3: Number of people required
Number of People Required: The results are shown
in Table 3. It can be seen from the results that
most respondents believed that almost all the assurance
techniques can be successfully performed for the scenario
given with 2 people. Furthermore, a vast majority
stated that Review of Client-Completed Self-Assessment
Forms, Architectural Reviews, Vulnerability Scans, Threat
Assessment, and Static Analysis can be successfully
performed for the scenario given with only 1 person.
A notable exception is Red Team Exercises where more
than 50% of the respondents (59% to be exact) believe that
it requires more than 2 people to complete this technique.
For all other techniques, at least 50% of the respondents
believe that at most 2 people are required for the technique
to be completed for the given example scenario.
Expertise Required: Table 4 shows the results obtained
regarding the level of expertise respondents thought was
required to perform the particular assurance techniques
successfully. Looking at the results, we find that different
levels of expertise are required for different techniques
in the type of scenario we described to the respondents.
Techniques such as Architectural Review, Interviews, Threat
Assessment and Cryptographic Validation seemingly require
Senior professionals (72%, 66%, 61% and 61% respectively).
Assurance Expertise Required Total
Technique P P(W) S Pr Resp.
Review of Policies 33% 35% 32% - 72
Review of Client Forms 45% 26% 27% 2% 64
Architectural Review 8% 9% 72% 11% 64
Configuration Review 21% 46% 33% - 57
Source Code Review 19% 18% 45% 18% 49
Observation 27% 46% 22% 5% 41
Interviews 11% 16% 66% 7% 55
Red Team Exercises 9% 10% 50% 31% 42
Penetration Tests 12% 29% 52% 7% 56
Vulnerability Scan 44% 40% 16% - 55
Social Engineering 20% 40% 35% 5% 40
Threat Assessment 6% 20% 61% 13% 54
Static Analysis 27% 33% 40% - 30
Dynamic Analysis 21% 34% 45% - 29
Fuzzing 30% 33% 33% 4% 27
Formal Verification 12% 25% 47% 16% 32
Cryptographic Validation 6% 10% 61% 23% 31
Emanation Sec. Analysis 8% 46% 35% 11% 26
Witnessed Test 7% 37% 53% 3% 30
Public Review 36% 28% 24% 12% 25
Table 4: Expertise required to perform each technique —
P: Practitioner; P(W): Practitioner with Supervision; S:
Senior; Pr: Principal.
Another interesting observation is that some techniques
are more likely to be performed by Practitioners if they
are provided with supervision. Looking at the table, we find
a big jump in the proportion of respondents who think that
techniques like Configuration Review, Social Engineering
and Emanation Security Analysis can be performed by
Practitioners with supervision as compared to without
supervision. This is an important aspect to consider as
it has implications in terms of the resources required for
the performance of the technique which would eventually
contribute towards its cost. There also seems to be
3 assurance techniques that could be conducted most
of the time by practitioners alone or with little
supervision: Review of Client-Completed Self-Assessment
Forms, Vulnerability Scans, and Public review.
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Assurance Time required to complete this technique Total
Technique <1 1 2 2-10 10-20 20+ Responses
day day days days days days
Review of Policies 3% 9% 12% 61% 11% 4% 66
Review of Client Forms 19% 28% 30% 20% 3% - 64
Architectural Review 3% 13% 19% 50% 13% 2% 62
Configuration Review 9% 16% 18% 40% 17% - 57
Source Code Review 2% 2% 10% 31% 31% 24% 49
Observation 3% 12% 39% 44% 2% - 41
Interviews 18% 11% 31% 33% 7% - 55
Red Team Exercises - 14% 29% 36% 15% 6% 42
Penetration Tests 2% - 16% 59% 21% 2% 56
Vulnerability Scan 14% 24% 38% 22% 2% - 55
Social Engineering 10% 15% 27% 42% 3% 3% 40
Threat Assessment - 19% 33% 33% 11% 4% 54
Static Analysis 3% - 57% 20% 10% 10% 30
Dynamic Analysis - 10% 38% 38% 7% 7% 29
Fuzzing - 18% 30% 37% 11% 4% 27
Formal Verification 3% 6% 13% 50% 10% 18% 32
Crypto Validation - 10% 10% 42% 16% 22% 31
Emanation Sec. Analysis - 8% 42% 42% 4% 4% 26
Witnessed Test 3% 3% 54% 37% 3% - 30
Public Review - 12% 8% 44% 12% 24% 25
Table 5: Time required to complete each assurance technique
Time Required: Table 5 shows the results of the question
which asked the respondents to enter the amount of time
they thought it would take to complete the particular
technique successfully for the type of scenarios given.
The duration of any assurance technique can be a
good measure of the effort required to complete it. From
the results shown in the table, we find that most of the
techniques can be completed within 10 days.
There are two assurance techniques for which a vast
majority believe that they can be completed within 2
days. These techniques are Review of Client-Completed
Self-Assessment Forms and Vulnerability Scans (77% and
76% respectively).
It is also noteworthy that an important fraction of
our respondents think that Source Code Review,Formal
Verification, Cryptographic Validation, and Public Review
may take more than 20 days to be completed. Thus,
we observe a large and varied spectrum of completion times
where some assurance techniques may be completed within




Excellent Very Good Good Fair Poor Responses
Review of Policies 6% 18% 46% 30% - 71
Review of Client Forms 3% 3% 33% 34% 27% 64
Architectural Review 6% 41% 45% 8% - 63
Configuration Review 2% 26% 46% 26% - 57
Source Code Review 6% 25% 49% 10% 10% 49
Observation 2% 22% 32% 44% - 41
Interviews 4% 31% 33% 27% 5% 55
Red Team Exercises 16% 36% 38% 5% 5% 42
Penetration Tests 13% 50% 32% 5% - 56
Vulnerability Scan 5% 33% 34% 24% 4% 55
Social Engineering 7% 15% 37% 33% 8% 40
Threat Assessment 4% 33% 46% 17% - 54
Static Analysis - 20% 30% 47% 3% 30
Dynamic Analysis - 17% 31% 52% - 29
Fuzzing - 22% 22% 52% 4% 27
Formal Verification - 31% 38% 28% 3% 32
Cryptographic Validation 6% 26% 45% 23% - 31
Emanation Sec. Analysis - 15% 39% 38% 8% 26
Witnessed Test 3% 20% 40% 27% 10% 30
Public Review 4% 12% 27% 38% 19% 26
Table 6: Effectiveness of Each Assurance Technique
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Assurance Cost Total
Technique Extremely Very Expensive Moderate Cheap Responses
Expensive Expensive
Review of Policies - - 14% 69% 17% 72
Review Client Forms - - 5% 36% 59% 64
Architectural Review - 5% 28% 58% 9% 64
Configuration Review - 2% 21% 67% 10% 57
Source Code Review 18% 20% 29% 29% 4% 49
Observation - - 17% 63% 20% 41
Interviews 2% 2% 25% 55% 16% 55
Red Team Exercises 2% 17% 52% 24% 5% 42
Penetration Tests 2% 10% 52% 34% 2% 56
Vulnerability Scan - 2% 20% 29% 49% 55
Social Engineering - 2% 23% 55% 20% 40
Threat Assessment - 4% 28% 57% 11% 54
Static Analysis - 3% 23% 64% 10% 30
Dynamic Analysis - - 35% 55% 10% 29
Fuzzing 4% 7% 15% 67% 7% 27
Formal 22% 25% 22% 31% - 32
Verification
Cryptographic 13% 26% 29% 26% 6% 31
Validation
Emanation 4% 23% 31% 34% 8% 26
Sec. Analysis
Witnessed Test - 10% 40% 37% 13% 30
Public Review 4% 8% 15% 31% 42% 26
Table 7: Cost of the Assurance Techniques
Effectiveness: We asked the respondents to state how
effective they thought the assurance techniques were “in
achieving its objectives”. The results are shown in Table 6
and they show that most of the assurance techniques have at
least Good effectiveness according the respondents (13 out
of 20 techniques). However, there are 5 assurance techniques
for which the majority (at least 50%) of respondents think
that the effectiveness is Fair at best. These techniques are
Review of Client-Completed Self-Assessment Forms, Static
Analysis, Dynamic Analysis, Fuzzing and Public Review.
Penetration Tests are the only assurance technique for
which the majority of the respondents (50%) feel that the
effectiveness is Very Good. The two assurance techniques
which have a considerable proportion of respondents rating
the effectiveness as Excellent are Penetration Tests and
Red Team Exercises. These can be considered to be the
best perceived techniques in terms of effectiveness by the
respondents in our sample.
The two assurance techniques which have a
comparatively higher proportion of respondents who rated
their effectiveness as Poor are Review of Client-Completed
Self-Assessment Forms and Public Reviews. These are
considered the least effective assurance techniques by the
respondents.
Cost: Respondents could also express their opinion on the
cost of conducting each assurance technique in the type of
scenarios given. The results are shown in Table 7.
We find that Review of Client-completed Self-assessment
Forms is considered to be by far the cheapest assurance
technique by a large majority of the respondents (59%) in
the described scenario, followed by Vulnerability Scans, and
Public Review.
There is also a group of assurance techniques, whose cost
for the scenarios described is perceived to be moderate:
Review of Documented Policies, Procedures and Processes,
Architectural Review, Configuration Review, Observation,
Interviews, Social Engineering, Threat Assessment, and
Dynamic and Static Analysis.
There are 4 techniques which are considered to be
at least expensive by over 60% of the respondents.
These techniques are Source Code Review (67%), Red Team
Exercises (71%), Penetration Testing (66%) and Formal
Verification (69%).
Complementary Assurance Techniques
One of the primary objectives of this research was to
identify assurance techniques which are complementary to
each other, providing insights on which are the assurance
techniques that are used together more often than others.
To this aim, we asked the respondents of the on-line survey
to list up to 3 complementary assurance techniques for every
assurance technique they were familiar with, which when
performed together could achieve high effectiveness.
Appendix C: Complementary Assurance Techniques
contains all the details of the results obtained, reporting
individual bar charts showing the number of complementary
assurance techniques suggested by respondents for each of
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the 25 assurance techniques studied. For the sake of clarity
and brevity, only aggregated high-level results are reported
here.
Most Commonly Chosen Techniques: Table 8
summarises the number of times each assurance technique
was chosen by respondents as the first, second and
third most complementary technique for other assurance
techniques.
Assurance Technique 1st 2nd 3rd Total
Review of Policies 4 5 4 13
Observation 3 2 2 7
Architectural Review 0 4 3 7
Interviews 3 1 2 6
Penetration Tests 3 0 2 5
Source Code Review 1 1 2 4
Static Analysis 3 0 0 3
Configuration Review 1 1 1 3
Vulnerability Scan 1 1 0 2
Dynamic Analysis 1 1 0 2
Review of Client Forms 0 0 2 2
Fuzzing 0 2 0 2
Witnessed Test 0 0 2 2
Threat Assessment 0 1 0 1
Formal Verification 0 1 0 1
Red Team Exercises 0 0 0 0
Social Engineering 0 0 0 0
Cryptographic Validation 0 0 0 0
Emanation Security Analysis 0 0 0 0
Public Review 0 0 0 0
Table 8: Most commonly chosen complementary techniques
Being chosen as the most common complementary
technique can be interpreted as an added value to the
utility of the assurance technique. If a particular assurance
technique is a complementary technique for another
assurance technique, the chances of it being included in
different assurance schemes is higher. This supports the
analysis in the previous section, which presented Review
of Documented Policies, Procedures and Processes and
Penetration Tests as the two most commonly used assurance
techniques across various assurance schemes. The likelihood
of their being chosen as complementary techniques may be
a contributing factor of such widespread use across schemes.
Groups of Complementary Techniques: On further
analysis of the individual distributions of the complementary
techniques, 3 main clusters of assurance techniques have
been identified.
1. Observation, Interviews and Review of
Documented Policies, Procedures and
Processes: Looking at Figure C1 in Appendix C:
Complementary Assurance Techniques for Review of
Documented Policies, Procedures and Processes, Figure
C3 for Observation and Figure C4 for Interviews, we
find that all these techniques are the top two most
commonly selected complementary techniques of each
other. This suggests that these techniques have a
higher chance of being performed together for assurance
schemes. Looking at Appendix A, we find that all these
three assurance techniques in both the PCI DSS and
ISO/IEC 27001 assurance schemes.
2. Vulnerability Scans and Penetration Testing:
Looking at Figure C6 in Appendix C: Complementary
Assurance Techniques, we find that Vulnerability Scans
(25) are the most common complementary technique
for Penetration Tests. Similarly, we can see in Figure
C7 that Penetration Tests (25) are the most common
complementary assurance technique for Vulnerability
Scans. Looking at Appendix A, we find that both these
techniques are used in 5 assurance schemes, namely,
ISO/IEC 27001 (though optionally), PCI DSS,
Common Criteria, CTAS and CPA.
3. Static Analysis and Dynamic Analysis: From
Figure C9 and C10 in Appendix C: Complementary
Assurance Techniques, we see that Static Analysis
and Dynamic Analysis are the most commonly chosen
complementary assurance technique for each other.
Looking at Appendix A, it seems none of assurance
schemes reviewed uses these techniques.
Cost-Effectiveness of Assurance Techniques
Collected data on perceived cost and effectiveness obtained
via the on-line survey was then used to derive a measure
of cost-effectiveness. Details about this measure as well
as all the calculations performed to get cost-effectiveness
values for each assurance technique are in Appendix
E: Cost-Effectiveness Calculations. Because of their
difference in nature, it was decided to split the analysis
between assurance techniques targeting security controls
and assurance techniques targeting individual competences.
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Figure 9: Cost-effectiveness of assurance techniques.
Figure 9 depicts cost-effectiveness for each of the
20 analysed assurance techniques for security controls.
Architectural review, penetration testing, and vulnerability
scans were perceived to be the most cost-effective assurance
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techniques. The least cost-effective assurance techniques
were perceived to be public review, fuzzing, static and
dynamic analysis, and emanation security analysis. It is
also worth highlighting the confidence level of respondents,
which varied in overall from 35.80% to 81.30% (see Appendix
E). The most confident responders were those who provided
information about the architectural review, review of
policies, interview, penetration testing, vulnerability scan
and threat assessment activities. On the other side, the least
confident responders appears to be the ones that evaluated
the static and dynamic analysis, fuzzing, emanation security
analysis, and public review activities, hence the least cost-
effective assurance techniques were also the ones respondents
were less sure about.
Cost-Effectiveness of Assurance Techniques
Combinations
We further elaborate on the combinations of assurance
techniques that can provide higher levels of effectiveness and
cost effectiveness. In order to identify such combinations
of assurance techniques, we filtered information retrieved
via the on-line survey. Specifically, we identified assurance
techniques that when performed together can be highly
effective. The data used for the identification of these
sets was performed on the basis of metrics, i.e., the overall
effectiveness, and cost effectiveness of individual assurance
techniques. Specifically, combinations were restricted to
sets of four assurance techniques (the ones highest rated
by respondents). We expressed the effectiveness and
cost effectiveness of each combination, by the product of
the individual assurance activity values per se. Further
information regarding the calculation of effectiveness and
cost-effectiveness of individual combinations is provided in
Appendix E: Cost-Effectiveness Calculations.
Figure 10 depicts the effectiveness of a list of combined
assurance techniques, and Table 12 in Appendix D:
Combinations of Assurance Techniques labels the list of
assurance techniques in each of the combinations. Looking
into Figure 10, “Comb 4.” ranks first amongst all the
identified sets of combined assurance techniques. More
specifically, “Comb. 4” consists of the following individual
assurance techniques: Penetration Tests; Architectural
Review; Reviewing Documented Policies, Procedures, and
Processes; Vulnerability Scans. In the second place, there is
“Comb. 5” that refers to Vulnerability Scans; Architectural
Review; Configuration Review; Penetration Tests, and
“Comb. 10”, which includes Architectural Review;
Configuration Review; Penetration Tests; and Reviewing
Documented Policies, Procedures, and Processes. “Comb.
3” ranks third, i.e., Red Team Exercises; Penetration
Tests; Reviewing Documented Policies Procedures, and
Processes; and, Vulnerability Scans. Finally, “Comb. 11”
consists of the forth top ranked combination that refers to
Threat Assessment; Architectural Review; Interviews; and,
Reviewing Documented Policies, Procedures, and Processes.

















Figure 10: Effectiveness of combined assurance techniques
Amongst the list of identified combinations, the least
effective combination is “Comb. 8”, which consists of a
combination of the following assurance techniques: Dynamic
Analysis; Fuzzing; Source Code Review; and Static Analysis.

















Figure 11: Cost-effectiveness of combined assurance
techniques
Figure 11 depicts the cost-effectiveness of each of the
identified combinations of assurance techniques. It seems
that “Comb. 4” (i.e., Penetration Tests; Architectural
Review; Vulnerability Scans; and, Reviewing Documented
Policies, Procedures, and Processes) ranks first also
when it comes to cost-effectiveness. “Comb. 5” is
ranked second (i.e., Vulnerability Scans; Architectural
Review; Configuration Review; and, Penetration Tests).
In the third position there is “Comb. 10” (i.e.,
Architectural Review; Configuration Review; Penetration
Tests; and, Reviewing Documented Policies, Procedures,
and Processes). The list of the top five highly
ranked combinations of assurance techniques, with regards
to cost-effectiveness, is completed with “Comb. 3”
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(i.e., Red Team Exercise; Penetration Tests; Reviewing
Documented Policies, Procedures, and Processes; and,
Vulnerability Scans) and “Comb. 11”, which includes
Threat Assessment; Architectural Review; Interviews; and,
Reviewing Documented Policies, Procedures, and Processes.
Cost-Effectiveness of Assurance Techniques for
Individual Competences
Figure 12 depicts the overall effectiveness of techniques to
assure individual competence to conduct the other assurance
techniques described above based on the values respondents
provided for the on-line survey. For each technique to assure
individual competence, Figure 12 also includes the number
of people who provided their perception of how effective each
technique was.
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Figure 12: Perceived effectiveness of competence ATs
Oral Examination (Viva-Voce) was perceived to be the
most effective one, closely followed by Employment History
and Qualification Review. However, the differences of these
two with respect to Paper Based Examination (Narrative
form) and Virtual Lab Examination, though existing, were
minimal. There was a more substantial difference with
respect to Paper Based Examination (Multiple choice),
which was clearly considered as the least effective technique
to assure individual competence.
0	   5	   10	   15	   20	   25	  
Comb.	  1	  (2)	  
Comb.	  2	  (1)	  
Comb.	  3	  (1)	  
Comb.	  4	  (4)	  
Comb.	  5	  (2)	  
Comb.	  6	  (2)	  
Comb.	  7	  (3)	  
Comb.	  8	  (2)	  
Comb.	  9	  (2)	  
Comb.	  10	  (2)	  
Comb.	  11	  (2)	  
Comb.	  12	  (1)	  
Comb.	  13	  (3)	  
Comb.	  14	  (9)	  
Comb.	  15	  (2)	  
Comb.	  16	  (1)	  
Comb.	  17	  (9)	  
Comb.	  18	  (4)	  
Comb.	  19	  (6)	  
Comb.	  20	  (1)	  
Comb.	  21	  (17)	  
Figure 13: Perceived cost-effectiveness of competence ATs
As part of the on-line survey, another question was
also asked, this time about what combination of techniques
would be the most cost-effective in assessing individual
competence. The results are reported in Figure 13 and Table
13 provides the mapping of each label in Figure 13 with the
corresponding combination. Most respondents (76 out of
115) selected the combination of Oral Examination (Viva-
Voce) and Employment History and Qualification Review,
which actually consists of a combination of the top two
highest rated techniques in Figure 12.
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Special Scenario: ICS Case Study
This study examines the application of assurance
techniques within Industrial Control System (ICS)
environments. To contextualise the opportunities and
challenges of applying such techniques, interviews with ICS
security practitioners (including CESG, penetration testing
providers, and a non-academic research institute) were
conducted to discover how ICS operators address security
risks in practice. A framework for future improvement
in ICS security is outlined from this review’s findings.
Three phases of the ICS system development lifecycle
are then examined (during product development; during
procurement; once operational) to determine when and how
the assurance techniques defined within this project can be
applied, and what challenges are present in conducting such
security assessments.
Critical infrastructure such as that of utility industries
(e.g., oil and gas) is a frequently cited example of an
ICSs, although their usage is considerably more diverse
and widespread. Service industries (e.g., logistics), and
manufacturing industries (e.g., aerospace) make heavy use
of ICS technologies. The technologies that support ICSs are
largely similar in concept, and in many cases, identical. The
technological similarity can be further expanded to small-
scale installation, such as Building Automation Systems,
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Figure 14: A Conceptual Model of an ICS: Safety and
Security Goals (Adapted from [5, 13])
At a conceptual level, an ICS can be seen as a series of
layers, split into two areas (Figure 14). Layers 0-3 constitute
the “automation network”. Present in layers 0-2 are
safety systems, the sensors and actuators that monitor and
manipulate physical processes, and the devices enforcing the
intended logic of such processes. Multiple instances of layers
0-2 may exist, which may be geographically clustered or
dispersed (e.g., a utility network may have many thousand
“field sites”). In both cases, they have been conceptually
labelled ”Cell Zones”. Layer 3 manages automation network
wide functions. Layer 3 systems capture and archive
cell zone process data, monitor these processes, and take
managerial action as necessary. Layers 4-5 are known as the
“enterprise network”. Centralised IT services are found here
(e.g., business-to-customer services). Both the automation
network and enterprise network may be physically isolated
from each other, in what is known as an “air gap” which
can act as a security feature. However, these networks in
contemporary ICSs are frequently interconnected, due to the
potential to facilitate core business functions (e.g., to enable
automation in a manufacturing system, through linking the
consumer purchasing system to the production line).
Risk Management, Risk Perception and Standards for
ICS Security
The use of appropriate assurance techniques within
the risk management process is paramount, as it is
the output of these techniques that influences the
way that risk is perceived, assessed and treated in a
cyclical fashion. Therefore, understanding the current
practices and challenges of securing ICS environments
must be contextualised, in order to understand the
potential application for assurance techniques within ICS
environments. Academic surveys of publications are
available from alternative sources (e.g., [13]). Instead, this
review intends to collate the perceptions and experiences
about ICS security of those with experience of the realities
of these environments.
Industry surveys such as that of ENISA [7] (EU-centric)
and SANS [15] (US-centric), highlighted low utilisation
of standards, with a greater preference for guidelines.
Standards where used included: ISO/IEC 270023; ISA/IEC
62443; and NERC CIP. In both surveys, fulfilment criteria
is not qualified as to the extent to which it constitutes (e.g.,
how close to achieving certification). Despite this, positive
respondent count remained low, with 10-20% current
implementation or utilisation and 10-45% planned. Such
findings raise question around security risk management
practices; more so if non-response bias is considered.
Survey results represent a snapshot in time, and may
not reflect the current status. This study does not purport
to be a comprehensive or quantitative reflection of what
is; however, interviewed practitioners, with experiences of
assessing many environments, expressed views that largely
paralleled the findings of surveys: strict conformance to
standards within automation networks was scarce, with
verified compliance or certification only where there was
a mandatory requirement for it. Notably this was
3ISO/IEC 27002 here is notable, as it outlines controls, rather than ISO/IEC 27001 which focuses on managing security risk.
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predominantly for NERC CIP requiring ICS operators.
Formal publication use focused on guidelines, with
standards also acting in this fashion. “Awareness” of
publications from NIST (notably 800-82 and the more
general 800-53) and CPNI (the Good Practice Catalogue)
was high within the critical infrastructure sectors, although
the perception of the latter was that much was now
outdated and needed replacement. These findings are in
line with SANS survey [15], which listed NIST 800-82 as
the most “utilised” ICS publication. Practitioners felt
such publications were used in an “informative” manner,
rather than strict conformance; however, this is unsurprising
given Knowles et al’s [13] findings that publication focus
centred on security control recommendation rather than risk
management (making any form of conformance challenging).
Perceptions of standards use within enterprise networks was
markedly different, with standardisation common where a
business requirement existed for it (notably for ISO/IEC
27001 and PCI DSS). Despite this familiarity with security
standardisation, it is clear that this process has not yet
“hopped the gap” into automation networks. It should
be noted, that as with the survey’s non-response bias,
these results potentially have their own dark figure of
publication adoption. Interviewed practitioners largely
experience environments with a requirement or interest in
security (e.g., through procuring a security assessment);
therefore, the true rate remains unknown.
Although standards adoption does not precede a strong
security posture, it does provide some indicator of an
industry’s maturity. Strong risk management can exist
without standardisation. Practitioners expressed views
that there were many examples of such cases in ICS
environments. The vast majority, however, fell short of
this goal. Practitioners stated that in many cases formal
processes for managing security risk did not exist, and was
largely divorced from implementation, with security risk
treated on an ad-hoc basis by a small number of active
engineers that championed security. In the rare occurrence
where processes did exist, practitioners referenced ISO/IEC
27005, with ISO/IEC 62443 in “some cases” but with its
adoption hindered as it is still considered “drafty”. Such
findings conflict with others from surveys, such as those
of a 2013 ENISA survey [8] on ICS security assessment
frameworks, where ∼78% respondents stated that a risk
management system for ICS security had been implemented.
This highlights two issues. First, that again, of non-response
bias. Second, the importance of treating quantitative
results with caution, as it says little of the depth and
complexity of what constitutes a risk management system
in practice. In the frequently cited situation of security
champions, such a process may exist, but is it integrated
into formalised decision making, and of influence to those
outside the adopted security function? Both issues here can
be extrapolated to raise questions about what the extent of
the “awareness” or “adoption” of guidelines truly represents.
In 2010, Anderson and Fuloria [1] wrote of a “natural
experiment” in ICS security, whereby the UK encourages
industry, the US enforces standardisation in the energy
sector, but not in others such as oil and gas, instead
providing guidelines, and European countries have adopted
a multitude of postures, including intervention. The perils
of enforced standardisation, with respect to NERC CIP
were also discussed; however, in the intermittent years
since this publication, it would be difficult to argue that
ICS operators have put forward a robust case for self-
determination for ICS security. Indeed, many have; our
findings suggest significantly more have not. In reading
this study, the stimulus of negative feelings would not be
unfounded. Security for many ICS operators, including
within the critical infrastructure that supports our very
society, has been deemed insufficient in many cases; however,
practitioners were equally clear in their views: security is
improving. The question that must be asked is whether
this improvement is fast enough, and whether a resilient
minimum can be achieved throughout the population of
operators without enforced standardisation. Despite NERC
CIP’s faults, the US energy industry was widely considered
to be leading the way in ICS security. Criticisms of
enforced standardisation must be balanced against the
counter argument of what operators would be doing if there
was no requirement. Our findings provide some resource for
this discussion. In such a scenario, one must postulate the
merits of one of the core principles of standardisation: “do
what you want, but you can’t be worse than this”.
The discussion has fallen so far upon the use of formal
publications and extent of security risk management. It is in
this latter category that we proceed, in order to explore the
challenges to its practice. Practitioners perceived a slow but
growing increase in managerial awareness and funding for
ICS security; if such perceptions are a reality, why and where
are many ICS operators failing in security risk management?
Our findings fall into four categories.
No Safety and Security Process Integration. Security
risk management, at least with respect to cyber security
(rather than just physical security), unlike its safety
counterpart, is a recent phenomenon in ICS environments.
It has largely transferred from the enterprise domain and
must adapt to its sub-ordination to ICS’ core operational
goals of Safety, Reliability, and Availability (Figure 14).
Practices for achieving this are immature. A failure
to employ security risk management processes could be
attributed to its failure to integrate with those for safety.
Practitioners perceived an almost wholly absent attempt
to integrate such processes in modern environment, where
they are instead treated in isolation. Furthermore, formal
security publications do little to encourage this through
largely neglecting safety [13]. Practitioner opinions on
why this occurs were split around two themes. First,
the engineering background of ICS practitioners, which
emphasises safety leading to a lack of understanding about
security requirements, treating Security as a “bolt-on”.
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Second, information requirements for risk management and
the information asymmetry for safety and security. In part,
this occurs due to the way data is computed. Safety is based
on trusted data sets (e.g., of historical faults) and handles
values in probabilistic ranges. Security, however, is event
driven, and there is a lack of such datasets and reliable
ICS security metrics [13]. Furthermore, practitioners
believed most ICS operators lack the infrastructure to
support security monitoring. Real-time process monitoring
exists on a wider scale, but is seen to be inadequate
for detecting most attack types. This was largely seen
to be a resource challenge despite funding availability.
Technology exists for passive network monitoring and
intrusion detection, and academia has extensively examined
real-time risk assessments [12]; however, any widespread
implementation is hindered by three factors: the large
financial and operational undertaking; the lack of security
risk management processes to make a business case for such
an implementation; the lack of trained staff to implement
and monitor the implementation.
ICS Risks: Perception, Acceptability and
Communication - Interviewed practitioners believed a
consequence of the educational gap was a systematic
underrating of security risks of individuals within many
ICS environments (security champions excluded). The lack
of ICS incidents was perceived to cause a lack of “dread”
[16], which creates a mental gap with the unremitting
cyber attacks of the enterprise network domain. Surveys
have shown improved awareness of threats; however, our
findings suggest non-response bias must be accounted for,
while further questioning the extent of the penetration of
awareness within ICS operators. In-depth risk perception
studies are yet to be conducted in this context, although one
study has examined ratings of Confidential, Integrity, and
Availability at each layer of the conceptual ICS model [10].
The perception of the frequency of malicious compromise
and incident is a larger issue: do these ICS attacks really
not occur or are they simply not identified due to a lack of
real-time monitoring and forensic capabilities (e.g., as may
be suggested by the frequent attacks on ICS honeypots)?
Risk perception can be modified through a process of risk
communication. The increasing frequency of ICS security
in the news and pop culture was seen to have had a positive
effect on encouraging greater security efforts; however,
practitioners identified areas of improvement for the
security community: focus more on providing remediation
than identifying vulnerabilities; improve communication of
security risks with safety personnel and senior management
(measured and relayed in terms each would understand)
which is currently described as “ineffective”; and focus
more on relatable threats rather than the sensationalist
(e.g., Stuxnet).
Risk Management at Enterprise and Automation
Network Boundaries - One symptom of the lack of
security risk management processes was deemed to be the
poor definition of roles and responsibilities for managing
components at the boundary between automation and
enterprise networks. Such components were deemed to
often be inadequately maintained and secured due to
conflicts over responsibilities. One practitioner argued that
the boundary itself should not require special treatment;
if you have a mature automation network and mature
enterprise network, you should have a well managed, secure
boundary. Unfortunately, one is usually weak, and that
is the automation network. A secondary consequence
of this poor boundary management is the use enterprise
technologies in the automation network. This manifests
itself in two ways. First, a direct use of the technologies
with physical proximity (e.g., a human-machine interface
on a tablet device). Second, when this is done remotely.
Neither is inherently bad, but the way that it is realised in
modern environments often can be; largely due to the rise
of Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) cultures, and the lack
of security awareness and training. One practitioner stated
that they had experienced the remote management of ICS
infrastructure by individuals on tablet devices within coffee
shops, and that the perception amongst individuals in these
environments is largely that “if they have Citrix and two
factor authentication they’re secure”.
Supply Chain Assurance - Recent concern around
supply chain assurance is not isolated to ICSs; however,
practitioners perceived ICS operators to enforce minimal
security requirements on the supply chain, despite the
integral and integrated role it plays in their operation.
Concerns fell into three themes. First, risks arising from
the large number of contractors (e.g., from maintenance
contracts, which may involve unsupervised access). Good
security risk management practice dictates the definition
and enforcement of policies and procedures for third party
providers; however, beyond personnel checks which are
conducted regularly (whose current practice one practitioner
described as “security theatre”) the perception and
experience was that policies and procedures are rarely made
available or enforced if they exist. Second, the procurement
process for ICS components (both hardware and software).
Many ICS have been demonstrated to have fundamental
design flaws over the past five years, which creates challenges
for securing them in operational environments. For example,
because patch availability varies (in some cases due to
inaction, but also through deliberate choice to prevent
conflicts with legacy components), and the challenges of
high-uptime patch management. Although component
security was perceived to have improved, mostly as a
result of industry and governmental pressure, most ICS
vendors were still perceived to have insufficient security
integration in their development lifecycle. Standards are
under development for component development (e.g., IEC
62443-4-1); however, only time will indicate their real-world
usage. Procurement in such an uncertain environment
is challenging. Assessment before procurement is one
option, but many ICS operators do not have the skills
to assess products in-house, and there currently exists
no certification framework to refer to for third party
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independent testing. Furthermore, components are typically
closed-source and closed-hardware which limits the types
of security assessments that can be conducted. The
biggest problem, however, was deemed to be that security
assessments are never conducted at all as operational teams
had limited influence on procurement where decisions were
largely based on costs. Risks arising from the current
scenario for product procurement are shown in Figure 15;
the alternative highlights the key role of security risk
management from ICS operators in ensuring resilient and
secure products through establishing a business requirement
for change. Third, the process of information sharing with
third parties to facilitate business operations in the up
and downstream supply chain. One concerning trend for
practitioners was the increasing outsourcing of ICS functions
(in many cases outside national borders), without validating
the security postures of these third parties. The enforcement
of entry-level security certification on the supply chain is
one potential route to address this, which is currently being
trialled by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority with
























Figure 15: The Security Risk Management of Operators and the Procurement Process
Assurance Techniques within ICS
In the midst of a largely immature environment for
security risk management the appropriate, effective and
economic application of assurance techniques becomes a
challenge. This section examines the current approaches for
assessing ICS environments. A set of principles is presented
based upon the findings of practitioner interviews. These
principles are then applied to the assurance techniques
defined within this study to examine their use within three
phases of the ICS system development lifecycle.
To what extent are ICS operators conducting security
assessments? Results of a 2013 ENISA survey [8] show
high variation: only 15% are ”always” testing, 30-35%
”often” and 60% ”sometimes”. The 2014 SANS survey [15]
has similar findings, but refers to how many operators use
broad techniques, and does not quantify their frequency.
Neither quantifies the extent of use. With hesitance of
repetition, non-response bias must again also be considered.
More interesting, perhaps, is who is conducting these
security assessments when there is third party involvement.
Practitioners described heavy involvement of governments,
primarily for critical infrastructure, which may come as
no surprise; however, private sector involvement varied
highly. Within the UK context, security assessments are
predominantly government-led for critical infrastructure,
either by CESG or government departments (in some
cases, facilitated with CESG involvement). Commercial
assessments of ICSs in the UK were described as significantly
less prominent than in other countries; notably the US.
As the UK ICS security industry matures, commercial
involvement may increase, as it has the secondary benefit
of reducing the burden on government assessments. Indeed,
the UK government has initiated schemes for such a
reason in the past: notably “IT Health Checks”4 for
public body systems. Furthermore, CREST (http://
www.crest-approved.org/), the leading UK body for
penetration testing, has recently announced the involvement
of CESG and CPNI in the expansion of its STAR scheme
which is targeted at critical infrastructure.
Practitioners were asked about their experiences of
what types of assurance techniques are used within ICS
security assessments. The perception was that for UK-based
assessments of automation networks, assessments were in
effect risk assessments that used the “big three” audit
techniques: Review of Documented Policies, Procedures,
and Processes; Observe; Interview. In-house technical
security assessment were rare, as ICS operators do not
yet have appropriately trained individuals to conduct such
tasks. Commercial security assessments, such as penetration
tests, were increasing for the critical infrastructure sectors,
but infrequent, and highly rare for non-critical ICS
environments. For enterprise networks, the frequency of
security assessments was deemed to parallel those of non-
ICS systems, although automation components within the
enterprise network would often be out of scope. It was
4http://www.cesg.gov.uk/servicecatalogue/service_assurance/IT-Health-Check/Pages/IT-Health-Check.aspx
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the general consensus of practitioners that current modes of
assessing such environments were limited and greater effort
needs to be placed on ensuring security controls are not only
in place, but are effective in their objectives.
For automation networks, the lack of security
assessments was suggested to lie with the lack of risk
management processes or business requirement for such
tests. A technical assessment would create a de-facto
obligation to address issues found. Security assessments
exist to push organisations to a higher level of security.
Vulnerabilities in assessments of any infrastructure are
frequently found; ICS are no exception, and arguably
present greater opportunity for vulnerability. A security
assessment in effect is the purchasing of a problem.
For operators that have invested heavily in security risk
management there is a benefit of such an assessment;
however, without the basic organisational competency for
assessing and managing security risk, any issues found will
be challenging to address, which may act as a deterrent.
Commercial security assessment providers described
methodologies for assessing the automation networks of
operational systems. Such assessments unsurprisingly
shied away from the active and found passive alternatives
to what would be conducted in a typical engagement.
Highly cited techniques included configuration reviews,
architecture reviews (including passive network monitoring
and mapping), physical inspections, and threat assessments.
Supplementary test-bed assessment were sought allowing
for greater active assessment, although few ICS operators
were found to have this capability (either owned or shared
with other operators), and many were not representative of
live networks. Third party involvement in the assessment
of security during procurement was rare, although one
practitioner stated its popularity is slowly increasing, and
that they encourage ICS operators to attempt to include
security testing clauses within their procurement contracts.
If the device fails a security assessments, a discount is
received. Based upon the findings of practitioner interviews,
five principles were derived for ICS security assessments of
live environments: PASIV.
Proximity requirements.Assurance techniques should
be used when the assessor is in physical proximity to the
system under evaluation. Remote assessment should be
avoided, but if a scenario necessitates this, it should only
conducted with alternative personnel present on-site.
Accessibility limitations. Assessments should consider
to what extent claims of assurance can be made and
addressed due to the wide accessibility limitations that
restrict assurance technique usage (e.g., proprietary, closed
source systems create little opportunities for the use of some
assurance techniques).
Safety requirements. Ensuring that the use of an
assurance technique does not negatively impact human and
environmental safety should be the primary goal of an
assessment.
Impact of the assurance technique. Assurance
techniques should not impact the core operational goals of
the operator, nor cause faults in live environments.
Value generated by using an assurance technique. A
cost-benefit trade-off must be considered in assurance
technique use and its implications for aiding the
management of organisational risk (e.g., considering the
extent to which a system under evaluation represents the
wider system due to the infeasibility of testing many
thousands of field sites).
To illustrate the limitations placed upon assurance
technique usage within ICSs, the application of assurance
techniques defined within this study to three phases of
the system development lifecycle is examined. The phases
focus specifically on the role of assurance technique in
product assurance within automation networks and excludes
services. Phases were selected based upon pressing sources
of risk identified in Section : assurance technique used
during product development; during procurement; once
operational. These phases were earlier illustrated in
Figure 15 and are described below:
Development During the supplier’s development process,
what assurance techniques can the supplier themselves
use to ensure that a product has been designed in
a secure manner? To illustrate the wider range of
potential assurance techniques that can be used in
this scenario, the focus here is on applying assurance
techniques within the product development process
itself, rather than the organisational security that
supports it. In practice, both are necessary to ensure
resilient products (e.g., to mitigate against supply chain
threats).
Procurement When a product is being procured, what
assurance techniques can the procuring operator use to
gain assurances of a product’s security?
Operational Once a system is operational, what assurance
techniques can be used in a security assessment?
Operational is split into two parts: First, the
assessment of products and the manner in which they
are deployed within a testbed setting. Second, a
broader review of how assurance techniques can be
used within live environments, while also considering
an organisation’s wider security processes and controls.
The application of assurance techniques is described in
Table 11. The mapping is based on a typical scenario for
an ICS operator, and follows the principles of only mapping
what is feasible and of benefit in such a case. Mapping
uses three labels. ”X” indicates an assurance technique
has widespread application, while ”×” means it is unlikely
for most cases. ”P” indicates a possible application but is
limited by certain factors, which are indicated by one of
two suffixes. ”(I)” when limited by concerns surrounding
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operational impact, and ”(C)” when the application is case
dependent (e.g., whether the operator has the resources to
fund a testbed, or has bargaining power in the procurement
process).
Assurance Technique D P O(T) O(W)
Review of Documented Policies,
Procedures, and Processes
P(C) × × X
Review of Client-Completed
Self-Assessment Form
P(C) P(C) × X
Threat Assessment × × P(C) X
Architectural Review P(C) × X X
Configuration Review X × X X
Source Code Review X × × ×
Observe P(C) × × X
Interview P(C) P(C) × X
Red Team Exercise × × × P(IC)
Penetration Testing X P(C) X P(IC)
Vulnerability Scan X P(C) X P(IC)
Social Engineering × × × X
Static Analysis X × × ×
Dynamic Analysis X × × ×
Fuzzing X P(C) X P(IC)
Formal Verification X × × ×
Cryptographic Validation X P(C) X P(IC)
Emanation Security Analysis P(C) × × ×
Witnessed Test P(C) P(C) X X
Public Review × × × ×
Table 9: The Feasibility of Using Assurance Techniques
for Three ICS Lifecycle Phases — D: Development,
P:Procurement, O(T): Operational (Testbed), O(W):
Operational (Whole inc. Organisation.
The mapping aids in illustrating the importance of
a robust product development lifecycle as it at such a
stage where there is greatest opportunity not only for
remediating security faults, but also conducting in-depth
assessments. Once operational the use of demonstrable
assurance techniques, such as penetration testing, becomes
limited and is marred by the PASIV principles imposed
upon the process. Tesbed assessment aids somewhat in
addressing this, but as discussed, representative testbeds
are a rarity. One limitation of such a mapping is that it
highlights only potential uses of assurance techniques, and
the need for further review with respect to three factors.
First, on where these assurance techniques are used. For
example, as shown in Figure 14, operational sensitivity
increases at lower layers of ICSs, and this mapping does
not consider the opportunities for assessing ICS components
that bridge the enterprise network boundary. Second,
how they are used. The enforcement of PASIV principles
requires assumptions not explicit in the mapping. A
conspicuous example of this is for architecture review.
Part of this process requires the mapping of current
assets and communications channels. Active techniques
that may be used in enterprise networks to facilitate this
such as port scanning can not be used. In automation
networks this mapping involves alternative approaches such
as passive traffic analysis, which is supported by other
assurance techniques (e.g., physical inspection, which is
defined here as “Observe”). Due to these differences, caution
should be expressed in extrapolating the cost-effectiveness of
techniques outlined in this study. Third, on what assurance
techniques are used. This report has defined commonly used
assurance techniques. For automation network assessments,
however, the inclusion of additional techniques may be






















Figure 16: Future Areas of Research for ICS Security
Based on the findings above, a number of practical
opportunities for future improvement were identified which
can be seen visualised in Figure 16. In many respects,
the challenges faced in securing ICS environments parallel
those of SMEs, but with considerably greater stakes.
The core area for improvement involves encouraging ICS
operators to develop security risk management systems,
and the areas outlined here can be seen to be a subset
of that. Interviewed practitioners as part of this study
described a scenario that does not call for highly advanced
technical solutions to improving the security of ICSs in
the majority of cases. Instead, greater focus is required
on the “mundane” fundamentals, before the advanced can
be practically contemplated and of real benefit. On the
human side this involves addressing the education gap for
security in a safety culture, and the importance of enforcing
security requirements beyond organisational boundaries.
On the technical side it involves establishing a greater
understanding of the assets within these environments,
and the attempt to provide greater validation that any
implemented security controls had achieved the desired
effect. Through this we can begin to understand cost-
effective approaches to securing such environments in order
to establish further managerial buy-in. The development of
appropriate security metrics is integral to this process.
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The Assurance Ecosystem: Economics
and Incentives
This document also sought to report a more high
level analysis of the economics of assurance schemes
and incentives in the assurance scheme ecosystem, which
could hamper/facilitate cost-effective assurance schemes and
techniques. In particular, a study of assurance schemes was
conducted in terms of the broad goals they aim to achieve
and the incentives that are in place so that all involved
stakeholders in the ecosystem work towards those goals.
This study was conducted analysing data obtained from
public sources and from the assurance schemes reviewed
as well as through a number of targeted interviews. We
particularly elaborate on two case studies: ISO/IEC 27001
and Cyber Essentials.
Seven main actors were identified to play a crucial role
as part of the broader assurance ecosystem in most of the
assurance schemes studied. These are:
Formal or de facto regulator(s) - Formal regulators are
usually governments (e.g., the UK government) or supra-
national organisations (e.g., European Commission). De
facto regulators include international organisations, such as
VISA, MasterCard, etc.
Standards body(s) - Organisations whose primary
activities entail the development and coordination of
standards and guidelines. This includes international bodies
like the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC), but also national bodies that have a direct input into
international bodies, e.g., the British Standards Institute
contributes to international standards.
Accreditation body(s) - Organisations who are usually
appointed by regulators and whose main task is to assess
the technical competence and integrity of certification
bodies (detailed below) regarding how these certifications
bodies conduct their evaluation services. Accreditations
issued usually have limited lifetime and require to be re-
issued regularly (e.g. UKAS states that after an initial
assessment visit; accreditation will be confirmed on an
annual basis; and full reassessment is performed every four
years5). Examples of accreditation bodies in the UK are
the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) for
several standards including ISO/IEC 27001, and IASME,
CREST, etc for Cyber Essentials Scheme. Based on
the EU Regulation (EU) 765/2008, accreditation bodies
for internationally agreed standards (like ISO/IEC 27001)
should be restricted to one on a national level.
Certification body(s) - Organisations whose business is
to check/evaluate businesses or companies’ conformity and
compliance with standards and guidelines. The main actors
identified under this entity are mainly practitioners, which
are able to work on the certification of individual businesses
or companies. Nevertheless, another type of actor, i.e.,
a consultant, might appear in some cases. The main
objective of a consultant is to provide consultant services
to a business or company in order for the latter to meet
certain requirements, and eventually help in getting certified
after being assessed by the certification body. Depending
on the standard, assessment and consultancy from the same
certification body may be forbidden.
Organisation(s) - Organisations involved in the trade of
services or goods to consumers or other organisations (e.g.,
supply-chain). These organisations procure the services of
certification bodies to get certified according to standards
or guidelines. Organisations might conduct self-assessments
according to standards or guidelines. Obviously, this does
not lead to any certification without a certification body
reviewing self-assessment reports (e.g. Cyber Essentials
Scheme). Furthermore, there might be cases where a set
of internal auditing activities could occur. Such internal
auditing might include supply-chain auditing, gap analysis,
or audits for certification.
Collaborator(s) - Collaborators could be perceived as
initiatives, forums, etc., which are able to influence the
formation of standards. These are differentiated from
business organisations since the latter in most cases produce
a product or provide services.
Consumer(s), purchaser(s) - Consists of entities that are
purchasing services for personal or not use.
There are also a number of other entities that, even
though they are not actors, play an important role in the
ecosystem:
Legal/Contractual framework(s) - Refers to the various
laws or contractual obligations set by regulators, which set
the rules all other actors in the ecosystem must abide by.
Standard(s) or guideline(s) - A standard is an agreed
way of doing something6, and a guideline can be considered
to be a statement by which to determine a course of action
or a best practice.
5http://www.ukas.com/library/Tools/The%20Route%20to%20Accreditation.pdf
6http://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/standards/Information-about-standards/what-is-a-standard/
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Figure 17: Assurance ecosystem
Figure 17 depicts actors, entities and interactions
amongst them. Dashed arrows or dashed rectangles indicate
potential existence of them, because different procedures
are followed in various assurance schemes. A potential
chain of actions would include a regulator to require/define
a legal or contractual framework and to recognise and
work with standards bodies and other actors to create a
standard or a set of guidelines to meet the legal/contractual
framework. Furthermore, a regulator is usually in a
position to appoint accreditation bodies that would set
the accreditation requirements certification bodies need to
comply with. Then, certification bodies would certify
whether organisations comply with standards or guidelines.
Note, however, that Figure 17 admits many interpretation
variations in terms of the potential chain of actions. For
instance, other possible chain of actions may include a
standard that was created in the first instance by one
or more standards bodies, and then regulators would set
the legal/contractual framework afterwards based on the
standards/guidelines. Another example is that certification
bodies, or businesses in the large may also participate and
influence in the development or refinement of standards, so
they not only abide by them but actively influence them.
The ultimate collective aim of such assurance ecosystem
is to deliver confidence, trust, and assurance to both
regulators and consumers [9]. In other related security
disciplines, it has been identified that, some times, even
if a collective aim is clear, individual incentives may be
misplaced, which can jeopardise the ultimate collective aim
of information assurance [3].
In terms of economic incentives, profit would
obviously be one such incentive as some of the actors in the
ecosystem are indeed private and for-profit organisations.
For instance, businesses and companies may want to get
certified according to a particular standard if this opens up
market opportunities for them. However, businesses may
be deterred to get certified if they cannot afford the cost of
doing so, or if this cost is too high when compared to the
market opportunities the certification may open up for them.
Furthermore, being certified provides a level of confidence
in the supply-chain, and helps to avoid data breaches (for
which they could be fined by law) and reputation damage.
A rather interesting topic is that of misaligned incentives.
Misaligned incentives are usually in place when there is
absence of proper rules that control the rewards or penalties
for the participants in a particular ecosystem. Examples of
misaligned incentives are liability and insurance. In the first
case, liability is known to be assigned to the party that can
manage best the risk; however in most cases allocation is
done poorly. In turn, insurance may raise issues in cases
where insurance parties cannot observe the behaviour of
insured parties, and the latter behaves recklessly [2].
Accreditation bodies are an actor of vital importance
in the assurance ecosystem. In all cases, its main goal
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should be to assure adherence with specific requirements
set by standards, whether international or national
standards. Regarding international standards, accreditation
is permitted via only one national body (UKAS), so this
might potentially lead to a monopoly. On the contrary,
licensing for some national schemes like Cyber Essentials,
can be provided by more that one accreditation bodies
(APM Group, CREST, IASME, and QG Business Group).
In this case, competition amongst various accreditation
bodies may exist, and the cost of assessment and licensing
might vary significantly amongst them. Variations in
cost might also stem from the incentives placed by each
accreditation body.
Certification bodies are usually for-profit, though there
may be some certification bodies that are not. In any case,
their revenue (and perhaps their economic survival) strongly
depends on how many organisations they certify, as well
as on the price they need to pay to get accredited by an
accreditation body (to be able to certify organisations). The
latter has obvious implications for organisations that would
like to get certified in turn, as the price for certifications is
likely to be affected by the costs set by the accreditation
body.
Consultancy companies also play a crucial role in the
ecosystem. Despite the fact that it is not explicitly
required for an organisation to go through the process
of consultancy, this might some times be a safer, faster
and cheaper route for an organisation to finally achieve
the desired certification. Some assurance schemes identify
potential conflicts of interest between certification bodies
and consultancy practices, so it appears that in most cases
consultants are to be different from certification bodies for
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Figure 18: Incentives to get individual competence
certification (X-axis percent of respondents, Y-axis reasons).
Finally, we also analysed the incentives for getting
individual competence certifications. To this aim, we
based on data gathered via the on-line survey. Figure
18 shows the results we obtained. In particular, 77.4%
of respondents stated that they pursue a certification to
enhance their credibility and marketability; 50.9% because
such a certification is required by businesses; 49.1%
indicated the it is required by the assurance schemes in
which they are involved in their day-to-day role; 41.5%
because they stated that they will earn more money
compared with non-qualified counterparts; and 41.5% that
will gain access to various benefits (e.g., reports, discussion
forums, etc.).
ISO/IEC 27001 Case Study
The main objective of ISO/IEC 27001 is to ”... provide
requirements for establishing, implementing, maintaining
and continually improving an information security
management system”7.To this aim, ISO/IEC 27001 defines
the requirements for an Information Security Management
System (ISMS), and it is designed in such a way to
ensure the selection of adequate and proportionate security
controls. Examining ISO/IEC 27001 in the context of the
assurance ecosystem, we identified that standard bodies
such as ISO and BSI are set responsible for its definition.
More specifically, the latter is recognised as the UK National
Standards Body by the UK Government8. It is also defined
in the memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the
UK Government and BSI9 that standards published by BSI
may have their origin in international standards developed
by ISO and IEC. Therefore, it is clear that the legal
framework for recognising a standards body for ISO/IEC
27001 in the UK, is in place. BSI’s main responsibilities,
including directions towards the development of British
standards are further clarified in the MoU between the UK
Government and BSI.
According to EU directives, a sole accreditation body is
set on a national level in order to accredit certification bodies
against internationally agreed standards, such as ISO/IEC
27001. The UK government appointed UKAS to be that
sole national accreditation body.Therefore, UKAS is able to
accredit or licence certification bodies, which in turn are
in position to assess, test and certify organisations. An
interesting topic of further clarification is that certification
bodies, being accredited by UKAS, are not permitted to
provide any consultancy services to organisation that will be
assess. This is a requirement set by ISO/IEC 17021, which
forbids consultancy from certification bodies. The main
reason for that is to ensure that there will be no conflicts
of interests between certifications bodies and organisations
being certified. Yet, the provision of consultant services
by other parties appears not to be forbidden. Figure 19





































Figure 19: Assurance ecosystem in ISO/IEC 27001
Cost consists of an important factor for selecting
the appropriate assurance scheme for an organisation.
Regarding the certification process for ISO/IEC 27001, that
includes a daily rate. Therefore, the cost of ISO/IEC 27001
is proportional to the size of the company. Based on our
findings during the interview process, a small company (i.e.,
approximately 50 employees and one office) requires four
days for the auditing process to complete. The daily cost
for the certification is around £750. Yet, the final cost for
being certified includes additional costs that refer mostly
to the number of resources (e.g., number of consultants)
and technologies used by the certification, and thus, raising
the total cost for the examined study to approximately
£6000. Hence, it appears that consultancy consists of
another factor that affects the overall cost of the ISO/IEC
27001 certification is the use of third party consultants. As
stated already, UKAS accredited certification bodies, are
not permitted to offer any type of consultant services to
organisation being certified by the same body. However,
there is no restriction for an organisation to get consultancy
by third party consultant companies. Such a process appear
to add an overhead of £5000 + VAT in the total cost of the
process for small companies (< 20 employees). In terms of
duration, that would require approximately three months to
complete10.
Cyber Essentials Case Study
Cyber Essentials is a UK ”government-backed, industry
supported scheme to help organisations protect themselves
against common cyber attacks”11. Specifically, the UK
government operates as its main regulator. A set of
various actors participated in the definition of the Cyber
Essentials Scheme, including the BSI standards body, and
organisations like the Information Assurance for Small
and Medium Enterprises (IASME) consortium, and the
Information Security Forum (ISF). The UK government
appointed a set of accreditation bodies. These are
currently the APM Group, CREST, IASME, and QG
Business Group. It is noteworthy that the definition of
more that one accreditation body is permitted due to
the fact that the defined assurance scheme consists of a
national, and not an international one (opposed to ISO/IEC
27001). In turn, Cyber Essentials certification bodies are
able to provide appropriate certification to businesses and
companies. Certification of companies can be done through
a self-assessment process (i.e., a businesses or companies
internal operation) that is further reviewed and assessed
by the certification body. Such a procedure leads an
organisation to be certified against ”Cyber Essentials”. A
second stage requires the organisation to be certified by
the independent Cyber Essentials certification body. The
latter, if successful, will eventually provide the organisation
with the certification of ”Cyber Essentials Plus”. Likewise
ISO/IEC 27001, there is the potential for assessors of
the Cyber Essentials PLUS level, to provide consultancy
services, but if a certification body acts as a consultant it is
forbidden in some cases to act as assessor, as well12. Figure
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Figure 20: Assurance ecosystem in Cyber Essentials Scheme
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of assurance, i.e., basic and PLUS. In respect to the
Cyber Essentials basic level, there is usually a fixed cost
of £300 (this amount has been identified for IASME13,
QG14 and some CREST-accredited certification bodies
like IT Governance15), and is independent of the size
of the company. Note, CREST requires a vulnerability
scan to be performed together with the review of client-
completed self-assessment forms even for Cyber Essentials
basics. Both assurance techniques have been identified
in this report as being cheap and Vulnerability Scans
was particularly considered one of the most cost-effective
assurance techniques. With the costs stated above, Cyber
Essentials can clearly be an affordable security solution for
many businesses. Nevertheless, the cost may increase when
there is a need for the PLUS level of assurance (e.g., for a
SME with less than 16 IP addresses in one location, there
are certification bodies that would charge around £1,65016),
which may also add up to further need for consultancy
services.
Having a closer look at the aforementioned case study,
it appears that being certified against ISO/IEC 27001 is in
general more expensive than Cyber Essentials (also when
compared to Cyber Essentials Plus). Note that the first
and most obvious reason is that ISO/IEC 27001 and Cyber
Essentials are not directly comparable to each other. Just to
give an example, they use different assurance techniques as
stated in Appendix A. Another reason for this difference in
price might also be related to the fact that for ISO/IEC
27001 the certification body must be accredited by the
national accreditation body, i.e., UKAS. In particular, the
accreditation process costs £1000 per day. Accreditation
requires in overall 15 to 20 days, depending on the size of
the certification body. Accreditations have to be revised on
a yearly basis, requiring four to six days to complete, and
certification bodies have to be fully accredited every four
years17. Then, this cost may be proportionally transferred
from certification bodies to organisations.
Finally, in terms of incentives, two main Cyber Essentials
incentives are reported here. The first one is about liability
or insurance. At least one of the accreditation bodies,
namely IASME, provides a cyber liability insurance. Such
an insurance cover, provides security or protection against
a loss or other financial burden stemming from event
management; data protection obligations; and liability18
issues (with an indemnity limit of £25,000). This is
definitely an important incentive that has been characterised
in the literature as a “misaligned incentive” [2, 3] when
it is not present. The second incentive is about added
value that particular accreditation bodies may want to
consider. An example of this is CREST, which also
includes a Vulnerability Scan as part of the Cyber Essentials
basics. Another example is IASME, which provides as
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Recommendations
Based on the data gathered and the analysis
conducted under the frame of this report, the following
recommendations should be considered for current and
future assurance schemes:
1. Reconsider assurance techniques for individual
competences. The first important result of this report
is that multiple-choice exams are used extensively, but
it seems they are perceived by experts as the least
effective to assure individual competences. The use
of multiple-choice exams, specially when they are the
only technique used to award a qualification, should
be reconsidered in future schemes. Options may
even include re-framing multiple-choice exams, e.g.,
APM Group seems to be using a qualitative rating of
confidence to be entered for each multiple-choice answer
within their CESG CCP assessments. Furthermore,
according to the results obtained in the survey, Oral
Examinations (Viva-Voce) and Employment history
and Qualification Reviewed were perceived to be the
most cost-effective combination to assess individual
competences.
2. Reconsider assurance techniques use based on
their cost-effectiveness. An analysis of survey
data identified that the most cost-effective assurance
techniques to assess security controls were architectural
review, penetration testing, and vulnerability scans.
Further analyses examined effective and cost-effective
combinations of assurance techniques and found the
highest combination in both analyses to be: penetration
testing; architectural review; reviewing documented
policies, procedures, and processes; and vulnerability
scans. The datasets presented are expected to provide
invaluable information in the development of future
iterations of assurance schemes.
3. Conduct a follow-up study to confirm the least
cost-effective assurance techniques. The least
cost-effective assurance techniques were perceived to be
public review, fuzzing, static and dynamic analysis, and
emanation security analysis. It is worth noting that
public review, static analysis, and dynamic analysis
were not found to be currently used within the
17 assurance schemes reviewed, emanation security
analysis was only used in one assurance scheme, and
fuzzing was only used in two. It is also worth noting
that these assurance techniques received less responses
in the on-line survey. A follow-up and more in-depth
study should be conducted focusing on these techniques
to be able to decide whether their contribution to
particular assurance schemes is (or could be) useful.
4. Assurance schemes to make explicit which
assurance techniques assess which security
controls. A limited number of assurance schemes
(excluding those for assessing individual competencies)
made explicit reference to the assurance techniques
that should be used to assess conformance. Cyber
Essentials was alone in having an explicit assessment
criteria, while other schemes that mention assurance
techniques, did so only for a subset of security controls
(e.g., PCI DSS). Based on stakeholder interviews, it was
determined that assessments primarily revolve around
the “big three” audit techniques (review, interview,
observe), with other assurance techniques being used
as audit evidence at the discretion of the assessor, and
if available. The initial mapping we have provided in
Appendix B should aid in facilitating understanding of
assurance technique use within schemes.
5. Explore the use of assurance techniques in
different life-cycle stages. Most assurance
techniques were reported to be used within assurance
schemes only in the operational stage of a system’s
life-cycle, with very few exceptions in some particular
assurance schemes, in which assurance techniques may
also be used at the pre-deployment stage. However, no
mention was found in any of the assurance schemes or
the interviews conducted about assurance techniques
being used in other stages of the life-cycle, like
acquisition or end-of-life. Therefore, an interesting issue
to explore would be the potential and benefit of using
assurance techniques in more stages of a system’s life-
cycle than just the operational stage.
6. Risk-based choice of the most suitable assurance
techniques. There is the notion of proportionality of
security controls to be implemented relational to the
risk in some assurance schemes (e.g. ISO/IEC 27001).
However, this notion seems not to be considered in
assurance schemes in order to decide the assurance
techniques to be applied to test security controls. An
extreme example, what is the point of conducting a
very expensive assurance technique to test a particular
security control (or families/sets of security controls) if
the likelihood of getting these controls compromised (or
having them not adequately configured) is very low and
the anticipated impact in a company’s assets (e.g. in
terms of revenue loss) should an attack exploit them is
also very low?
7. Consider special cyber security scenarios like
ICS. A review of ICS environments indicated an
endemic lack of security risk management processes
in ICS environments, with security assessments (where
they occurred) often providing limited assurance about
an environment’s security. In order to encourage the
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development of ICS security risk management processes
a series of practical “next steps” were identified,
which involves encouraging: safety and security process
integration; security awareness; asset management with
security considerations; passive monitoring; validation
of security postures; supply chain assurance for both
products and services (including contractors).
8. Reconsider Vulnerability Scans for Cyber
Essentials Basic. The flexibility, and diversity
provided within the Cyber Essentials scheme was
perceived to be very beneficial in encouraging
innovation and facilitating the entry of the scheme into
the mass market. However, as reported in the Cyber
Essentials ecosystem case study, different accreditation
bodies suggest different assurance techniques for Cyber
Essentials in its basic form, i.e., some accreditation
bodies would require only Review of Client-completed
Self-assessment Forms while others would require
Review of Client-completed Self-assessment Forms
together with Vulnerability Scans. Based on the results
from the on-line survey, both assurance techniques were
perceived to be similar in terms of number of people,
expertise, duration, and cost required to conduct
the technique. However, Vulnerability Scans were
perceived to be one of the most cost-effective assurance
techniques, so including them if the added costs to get
the certification are not significantly increased would
seem, a priori, beneficial.
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CPA Evaluation of developer documentation to seek
eveidence that various mitigations are present
and to identify products with known issues
Operational ISO 17025 (Evaluation team), ISO
27001 (Lead auditor), ISO/IEC
27000:2005, ISO/IEC 18028:2006
(Product developers, 3rd party
suppliers)
OFFICIAL Xsig
CAS-T Evidence is gathered and reviewed to ensure
compliance with all relevant standards
Operational ISO 17025 (General lab requirements),





CAS-D Obtaining an audit trail showing that data has
been processed and sanitized appropriately
Operational ISO 17025 (General lab requirements),





CAS-SS Ensure to HMG IA Standard No. 5 Sanitization
Methodology is followed
Operational ISO 17025 (General lab requirements),





CTAS Produce an assessment statement outlining
risks and recommendations
Operational ISO 17025 (General lab requirements),
ISO 27001 (lead auditor), CHECK







Ensure that the company has a good standard
of professionalism and capability in four areas
that support penetration testing engagements:
(1) Company operating procedures and
standards; (2) Personnel security and
evelopment; (3) Approach to testing; (4)
Data security. Based on the assessment, the
request for membership will pass or fail.
Operational ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO 9001 are
mentioned but not mandatory, just







Ensure that the company has the necessary
capabilities to conduct IT Health CHECKs over
three areas: (1) company background (e.g.,
previous work); (2) practical assessments (e.g.,
methodology); (3) staff resources e.g., that
there is enough staff members with CHECK
qualifications to form a team). Based on the
assessment, the request for accreditation will
pass or fail
Operational Appropriate CHECK qualifications
and security clearances (SC) for the
individuals that make up a CHECK





PCI DSS Review/Examine is mentioned in PCI DSS
v3. These can be used to evaluate security







Ensures that the organisatonal has
appropriately implemented an ISMS. This
technique generates audit evidence (facts
relating to performance of the ISMS).
Operational Audit type dependent. In some cases,
no requirement (e.g., internal audits).
For ISO/IEC 27001 qualifications, there
are training course requirements. For
example, an ISO/IEC 27001 Lead
Auditor is required to undergo a five day
training course, and pass a qualification
exam. If an ISO/IEC 27001 audit
is from an accreditation body they
will ensure auditors are competent
through validating qualifications and





CC Judge adequacy of documentation describing
how the user can handle ToE. It provides
increased assurance that the modelled security















Organisations wishing to achieve certification
must complete a self-assessment form. This
will be reviewed by the Certification Body
through which they are undergoing assessment.
Operational The review must be conducted by an
approved Certification Body from one





PCI DSS Conduct self-assessment for some merchants Operational In some cases a QSA may be required;
however, the self-assessment may






CAS-T Identification of possible threats which can
affect the system
Operational ISO 17025 (General lab requirements),





CAS-D Identification of possible threats which can
affect the system
Operational ISO 17025 (General lab requirements),





CAS-SS Identification of possible threats which can
affect the system
Operational ISO 17025 (General lab requirements),





CTAS Provide documented recommendations and
evaluations of the system based on the Target
of Evaluation (ToE)
Operational ISO 17025 (General lab requirements),
ISO 27001 (lead auditor), CHECK






CC Provide additional assurance from the
development of a formal security policy model
of the TSF, and establishing a correspondence












The test scecification contains multiple
requirements that fall under configuration,
notably: (i) ingress filtering of binaries
through email and web browsing, which if
fails, a verification of the extent user access
is blocked; (ii) an authenticated vulnerability
scan of a system (e.g., to determine patch level
and configuration risks).
Operational The configuration review must be
conducted by an approved Certification
Body from one of the four accrediation






CTAS Part of the Evaluation Work Program (EWP)
which is aimed to clearly define the Target of
Evaluation (ToE).
Operational ISO 17025 (General lab requirements),
ISO 27001 (lead auditor), CHECK




CC Determine the completeness and structure of






CAPS Evaluate products to discover flaws Pre-
Deployment
UK Government’s List X scheme SECRET, TOP-
SECRET
Xsig
Observe PCI DSS The use of observation is explicitly referenced
in PCI DSS v3 (e.g., ”Observe an administrator
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Ensures that the organisatonal has
appropriately implemented an ISMS. This
technique generates audit evidence (facts
relating to performance of the ISMS).
Operational Audit type dependent. In some cases,
no requirement (e.g., internal audits).
For ISO/IEC 27001 qualifications, there
are training course requirements. For
example, an ISO/IEC 27001 Lead
Auditor is required to undergo a five day
training course, and pass a qualification
exam. If an ISO/IEC 27001 audit
is from an accreditation body they
will ensure auditors are competent
through validating qualifications and





CAS-D To ensure products are working in accordance
with their certifications and reducing risk of
unexpected disruptions to the service
Operational Developed Vetting (DV) clearance for
destruction of IL6 media, Security
checks (SC) for IL5 and Baseline





CAS-SS Ensure safe transport of equipment and correct
use of sanitization equipment
Operational DV clearance for Top Secret, SC for




Interview CC Check awareness of the application of defined
standards and procedures





Ensures that the organisatonal has
appropriately implemented an ISMS. This
technique generates audit evidence (facts
relating to performance of the ISMS).
Operational Audit type dependent. In some cases,
no requirement (e.g., internal audits).
For ISO/IEC 27001 qualifications, there
are training course requirements. For
example, an ISO/IEC 27001 Lead
Auditor is required to undergo a five day
training course, and pass a qualification
exam. If an ISO/IEC 27001 audit
is from an accreditation body they
will ensure auditors are competent
through validating qualifications and










CBEST/STAR A report that describes the findings of the
security posture of an organisation. This
assurance technique will provide evidence
about the of the organisation to social and
technical attacks. For CBEST engagement,
this will be passed onto the UK Financial
Authorities (i.e., the regulator). STAR report
have no requirement for circulation.
Operational CREST STAR Member Company
and individuals with CREST STAR
qualifications. A threat intelligence






CTAS Documented answers and related observations
and recommendations based on the
evaluationsconducted by the CTAS company
Operational Testing must meet the ITHSC





CPA Investigation and resolving of identified flaws;
ensure the quality of the product.
Operational ISO 17025 (Evaluation team), ISO
27001 (Lead auditor), ISO/IEC
27000:2005, ISO/IEC 18028:2006
(Product developers, 3rd party
suppliers)
OFFICIAL Xsig
CC Confirm that the potential vulnerabilities
cannot be exploited in the operational







PCI DSS This assurance technique generates a report
which may be used as audit evidence (by a
QSA).
Operational None (note: vulnerability scans (a







Ensures that the organisatonal has
appropriately implemented an ISMS. This
assurance technique generates a report which
may be used as audit evidence.
Operational A penetration test is unlikely to be
conducted by an auditor, with it instead,
likely acting as client-generated audit
evidence. No minimum qualification












To check for signs of obvious and known
vulnerabilities in a client’s system, from both
an internal and external vantage point.
Operational The vulnerability scan must be
conducted by an approved Certification
Body from one of the four accrediation






Ensures that the organisatonal has
appropriately implemented an ISMS. This
assurance technique generates a report which
may be used as audit evidence.
Operational A vulnerability scan is unlikely to be
conducted by an auditor, with it instead,
likely acting as client-generated audit
evidence. No minimum qualification





PCI DSS This assurance technique generates a report





CPA Investigation and resolving of identified flaws Operational ISO 17025 (Evaluation team), ISO
27001 (Lead auditor), ISO/IEC
27000:2005, ISO/IEC 18028:2006
(Product developers, 3rd party
suppliers)
OFFICIAL Xsig
CTAS Part of the Evaluation Work Program (EWP)
which is aimed to clearly define the Target of
Evaluation (ToE).
Operational ISO 17025 (General lab requirements),
ISO 27001 (lead auditor), CHECK




CC Deals with the threat that an attacker will
be able to discover flaws that will allow
unauthorised to data and functionality, allow
the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF,










CBEST/STAR A report that describes the findings of the
security posture of an organisation. This
assurance technique will provide evidence
about the susceptibility of some individuals
in the organisation to social attacks. For
CBEST engagement, this will be passed
onto the UK Financial Authorities (i.e., the
regulator). STAR report have no requirement
for circulation.
Operational CREST STAR Member Company
and individuals with CREST STAR
qualifications. A threat intelligence




Fuzzing CPA Check if robust or not Operational ISO 17025 (Evaluation team), ISO
27001 (Lead auditor), ISO/IEC
27000:2005, ISO/IEC 18028:2006
(Product developers, 3rd party
suppliers)
OFFICIAL Xsig
CAPS Check if robust or not Pre-
Deployment
UK Government’s List X scheme SECRET, TOP-
SECRET
Xsig
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CC Provide supplement assurance by a (semi-
)formal presentation of the requirements,
functional specifications, high and low level









CPA Compliance with good commercial practice Operational FIPS-140/2, CAVP, CMVP,
CESG/CAPS
OFFICIAL Xmin
CAS PKI CA Compliance with CESG good practice guides
and cryptographic policy
Operational CAVP, CMVP FIPS, CPA OFFICIAL-
COMMERCIAL
Xsig
CTAS Part of the Evaluation Work Program (EWP)
which is aimed to clearly define the Target of
Evaluation (ToE).
Operational ISO 17025 (General lab requirements),
ISO 27001 (lead auditor), CHECK




CC Precludes the use of unvalidated cryptography

















UK Government’s List X scheme SECRET, TOP-
SECRET
Xsig
Witnessed Test CPA Technical mitigations for the product to
implement.
Operational ISO 17025 (Evaluation team), ISO
27001 (Lead auditor), ISO/IEC
27000:2005, ISO/IEC 18028:2006








Successful candidates must score 60% of
available marks in the written (54/90) and
practical (90/150) comonents. The written
component is multiple choice; answers for the







Successful candidates must score 60% of
available marks in the written (72/120) and
practical (60/100) comonents. The written
component is multiple choice; answers for the
practical assessment are also multiple choice.
N/A None for the candidate. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the










Pass or fail. Three sections - candidates must
score the minimum number of marks in each
(fail in one section results in an overall fail):
written component requiring 90/135 marks
where 90 come from a multiple choice exam (1
mark each question), and 45 from a long-form
exam (15 marks each question). The practical
component requires 140/210 marks.
N/A None for the candidate. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the











Pass or fail. Three sections - candidates must
score the minimum number of marks in each
(fail in one section results in an overall fail):
written component requiring 90/135 marks
where 90 come from a multiple choice exam
(1 mark each question), and 45 from a long-
form exam (15 marks each question). The
practical component requires 140/210 marks.
NOTE: The assessment for CCSAM does not
include a virtual lab assessment, but instead
an additional theory section.





Pass of fail. Consists of multiple choice paper,
long question, virtual lab, and viva interview.
Pass/fail crtieria not stated.
N/A None for the candidate. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the







Pass or fail. Consists of multiple choice paper,
long question, virtual lab, and viva interview.
Pass/fail crtieria not stated.
N/A Tiger Scheme QSTM. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the









Pass or fail (must pass all components w/ 60%
or more, or all are failed): A 100-question
one hour multiple choice exam. A one hour
written paper which covers theoretical and
practical aspects of the course content. A two
hour practical assessment, which provides a full
scenario for penetration testing. A 15 - 30-
minute viva during which students will provide
a synopsis of their findings from the practical
assessment.
N/A None for the candidate. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the









Pass or fail - unlike other Cyber Scheme
qualifications, the CSTL is assessed through a
one day practical virtual lab examination, and
a viva interview from a CHECK Team Leader.
N/A None for the candidate. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the










Pass of fail. Consists of multiple choice paper,
long question, virtual lab, and viva interview.
Pass/fail crtieria not stated.
N/A None for the candidate. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the







Pass or fail. Consists of multiple choice paper,
long question, virtual lab, and viva interview.
Pass/fail crtieria not stated.
N/A Tiger Scheme QSTM. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the









Pass or fail (must pass all components w/ 60%
or more, or all are failed): A 100-question
one hour multiple choice exam. A one hour
written paper which covers theoretical and
practical aspects of the course content. A two
hour practical assessment, which provides a full
scenario for penetration testing. A 15 - 30-
minute viva during which students will provide
a synopsis of their findings from the practical
assessment.
N/A None for the candidate. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the









Pass or fail - unlike other Cyber Scheme
qualifications, the CSTL is assessed through a
one day practical virtual lab examination, and
a viva interview from a CHECK Team Leader.
N/A None for the candidate. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the





CCP Pass or fail - the candidate does or does not
have the required level of experience and/or
qualifications.
N/A Each role is based upon industry
experience. ”Penetration Testing”
is a unique role, as unlike the
others it is aligned with industry
qualifications. Candidate’s must
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Pass or fail. Three sections - candidates must
score the minimum number of marks in each
(fail in one section results in an overall fail):
written component requiring 90/135 marks
where 90 come from a multiple choice exam (1
mark each question), and 45 from a long-form
exam (15 marks each question). The practical
component requires 140/210 marks.
N/A None for the candidate. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the









Pass or fail. The assessment differs for
CCSAS and CCSAS. CCSAM has a multiple
choice, long-form and ”scenario” (but still
theory) component. CCSAS has a multiple
choice, long-form, and virtual lab component.
Candidates must pass all three sections to
achieve the qualification.





Pass of fail. Consists of multiple choice paper,
long question, virtual lab, and viva interview.
Pass/fail crtieria not stated.
N/A None for the candidate. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the







Pass of fail. Consists of multiple choice paper,
long question, virtual lab, and viva interview.
Pass/fail crtieria not stated.
N/A Tiger Scheme QSTM. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the









Pass or fail (must pass all components w/ 60%
or more, or all are failed): A 100-question
one hour multiple choice exam. A one hour
written paper which covers theoretical and
practical aspects of the course content. A two
hour practical assessment, which provides a full
scenario for penetration testing. A 15 - 30-
minute viva during which students will provide
a synopsis of their findings from the practical
assessment.
N/A None for the candidate. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the









CISSP Pass or Fail depending on outcome of exam N/A For the candidate a minimum of five









Pass or fail - the candidate does or does not








Successful candidates must score 60% of
available marks in the written (54/90) and
practical (90/150) comonents. The written
component is multiple choice; answers for the







Successful candidates must score 60% of
available marks in the written (72/120) and
practical (60/100) comonents. The written
component is multiple choice; answers for the
practical assessment are also multiple choice.
N/A None for the candidate. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the










Pass or fail. Three sections - candidates must
score the minimum number of marks in each
(fail in one section results in an overall fail):
written component requiring 90/135 marks
where 90 come from a multiple choice exam (1
mark each question), and 45 from a long-form
exam (15 marks each question). The practical
component requires 140/210 marks.
N/A None for the candidate. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the









Pass or fail. The assessment differs for
CCSAS and CCSAS. CCSAM has a multiple
choice, long-form and ”scenario” (but still
theory) component. CCSAS has a multiple
choice, long-form, and virtual lab component.
Candidates must pass all three sections to
achieve the qualification.





Pass or fail. 80 multiple choice questions, with






Pass of fail. Consists of multiple choice paper,
long question, virtual lab, and viva interview.
Pass/fail crtieria not stated.
N/A None for the candidate. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the







Pass of fail. Consists of multiple choice paper,
long question, virtual lab, and viva interview.
Pass/fail crtieria not stated.
N/A Tiger Scheme QSTM. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the









Pass or fail. Unknown number of multiple








Pass or fail (must pass all components w/ 60%
or more, or all are failed): A 100-question
one hour multiple choice exam. A one hour
written paper which covers theoretical and
practical aspects of the course content. A two
hour practical assessment, which provides a full
scenario for penetration testing. A 15 - 30-
minute viva during which students will provide
a synopsis of their findings from the practical
assessment.
N/A None for the candidate. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the









CISSP Ensure that candidates with required work
experience are able to appear for the exam
N/A For the candidate a minimum of five








Pass or fail - the candidate does or does not
have the required level of qualifications.
N/A Requires a specific ”Intermediate”
level qualification (see Table) from
one qualification body: CREST; Tiger
Scheme; Cyber Scheme. Security






Pass or fail - the candidate does or does not
have the required level of qualifications.
N/A Requires a specific ”Advanced” level
qualification (see Table) from one
qualification body: CREST; Tiger
Scheme; Cyber Scheme. Security
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CCP Pass or fail - the candidate does or does not
have the required level of experience and/or
qualifications.
N/A Each role is based upon industry
experience. ”Penetration Testing”
is a unique role, as unlike the
others it is aligned with industry
qualifications. Candidate’s must





CLAS Pass or fail - the candidate does or does not
have the required level of experience and/or
qualifications.
N/A ”Any” level of CCP qualification is






Pass of fail. Consists of multiple choice paper,
long question, virtual lab, and viva interview.
Pass/fail crtieria not stated.
N/A Tiger Scheme QSTM. For this
qualification to qualify for the
equivalent CHECK qualification, the
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Control Families Assurance Technique Count
A.5.1 Management Direction for Information Security 5
A.6.1 Internal Organisation 6
A.6.2 Mobile Devices and Teleworking 9
A.7.1 Prior to Employment 7
A.7.2 During Employment 8
A.7.3 Termination and Change of Employment 5
A.8.1 Responsibility for Assets 7
A.8.2 Information Classification 10
A.8.3 Media Handling 9
A.9.1 Business Requirement of Access Control 12
A.9.2 User Access Management 9
A.9.3 User Responsibilities 8
A.9.4 System and Application Access Control 10
A.10.1 Cryptographic Controls 10
A.11.1 Secure Areas 10
A.11.2 Equipment 10
A.12.1 Operational Procedures and Responsibilities 11
A.12.2 Protection from Malware 9
A.12.3 Backup 5
A.12.4 Logging and Monitoring 7
A.12.5 Control of Operational Software 9
A.12.6 Technical Vulnerability Management 20
A.12.7 Information Systems Audit Considerations 5
A.13.1 Network Security Management 14
A.13.2 Information Transfer 12
A.14.1 Security Requirement of Information Systems 13
A.14.2 Security in Development and Support Processes 19
A.14.3 Test Data 5
A.15.1 Information Security in Supplier Relationships 6
A.15.2 Supplier Service Delivery Management 5
A.16.1 Management of Information Security Incidents and Improvements 5
A.17.1 Information Security Continuity 6
A.17.2 Redundancies 6
A.18.1 Compliance with Legal and Contractual Requirements 10
A.18.2 Information Security Reviews 19
Table 11: The Number of Assurance Techniques for Each Security Control Family
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Appendix C: Complementary Assurance Techniques
C1: Review of Policies C2: Review of Client Forms
C3: Observation C4: Interviews
C5: Red Team Exercise C6: Penetration Tests
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C7: Vulnerability Scans C8: Source Code Review
C9: Static Analysis C10: Dynamic Analysis
C11: Fuzzing C12: Social Engineering
C13: Architectural Review C14: Configuration Review
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C15: Threat Assessment C16: Formal Verification
C17: Cryptographic Validation C18: Emanation Security Analysis
C19: Witnessed Test C20: Public Review
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Appendix D: Combinations of Assurance Techniques
Label Combination of assurance techniques for Sec. Controls
Comb. 1 Reviewing Documented Policies, Procedures, and Processes; Interviews; Observation;
Reviewing Client-Completed Self-Assessment Form
Comb. 2 Observation; Interviews; Witnessed Test;
Reviewing Documented Policies, Procedures, and Processes
Comb. 3 Red Team Exercise; Penetration Tests;
Reviewing Documented Policies, Procedures, and Processes; Vulnerability Scans
Comb. 4 Penetration Test; Architectural Review; Vulnerability Scans;
Reviewing Documented Policies, Procedures, and Processes
Comb. 5 Vulnerability Scans; Architectural Review; Configuration Review; Penetration Tests
Comb. 6 Source Code Review; Configuration Review; Static Analysis
Reviewing Documented Policies, Procedures, and Processes
Comb. 7 Static Analysis; Architectural Review; Dynamic Analysis; Fuzzing
Comb. 8 Dynamic Analysis; Fuzzing; Source Code Review; Static Analysis
Comb. 9 Social Engineering; Interviews; Observation; Threat Assessment
Comb. 10 Architectural Review; Configuration Review; Penetration Tests;
Reviewing Documented Policies, Procedures, and Processes
Comb. 11 Threat Assessment; Architectural Review; Interviews;
Reviewing Documented Policies, Procedures, and Processes
Comb. 12 Formal Verification; Architectural Review; Social Engineering;
Reviewing Documented Policies, Procedures, and Processes
Comb. 13 Cryptographic Validation; Configuration Review; Formal Verification;
Reviewing Documented Policies, Procedures, and Processes
Comb. 14 Emanation Analysis; Architectural Review; Penetration Testing;
Reviewing Documented Policies, Procedures, and Processes
Comb. 15 Witnessed Test; Interviews; Observations;
Reviewing Documented Policies, Procedures, and Processes
Comb. 16 Public Reviews; Observations; Source Code Review; Vulnerability Scans
Table 12: Combinations of assurance techniques for security controls
Label Combination of assurance techniques for Ind. Competences
Comb. 1 Virtual Lab Examination, Oral Examination (Viva-Voce)
Paper Based Examination (Narrative form), Paper Based Examination (Multiple choice)
Employment History and Qualification Review
Comb. 2 Virtual Lab Examination, Oral Examination (Viva-Voce)
Paper Based Examination (Narrative form), Paper Based Examination (Multiple choice)
Comb. 3 Virtual Lab Examination, Oral Examination (Viva-Voce)
Paper Based Examination (Narrative form), Employment History and Qualification Review
Comb. 4 Virtual Lab Examination, Oral Examination (Viva-Voce)
Paper Based Examination (Narrative form)
Comb. 5 Virtual Lab Examination, Oral Examination (Viva-Voce)
Paper Based Examination (Multiple choice), Employment History and Qualification Review
Comb. 6 Virtual Lab Examination, Oral Examination (Viva-Voce)
Employment History and Qualification Review
Comb. 7 Virtual Lab Examination, Oral Examination (Viva-Voce)
Comb. 8 Virtual Lab Examination, Paper Based Examination (Narrative form)
Employment History and Qualification Review
Comb. 9 Virtual Lab Examination, Paper Based Examination (Narrative form)
Comb. 10 Virtual Lab Examination, Paper Based Examination (Multiple choice)
Employment History and Qualification Review
Comb. 11 Virtual Lab Examination, Paper Based Examination (Multiple choice)
Comb. 12 Virtual Lab Examination, Employment History and Qualification Review
Comb. 13 Paper Based Examination (Narrative form), Paper Based Examination (Multiple choice)
Employment History and Qualification Review
Comb. 14 Paper Based Examination (Narrative form), Employment History and Qualification Review
Comb. 15 Oral Examination (Viva-Voce), Paper Based Examination (Narrative form)
Paper Based Examination (Multiple choice), Employment History and Qualification Review
Comb. 16 Oral Examination (Viva-Voce), Paper Based Examination (Narrative form)
Paper Based Examination (Multiple choice)
Comb. 17 Oral Examination (Viva-Voce), Paper Based Examination (Narrative form)
Employment History and Qualification Review
Comb. 18 Oral Examination (Viva-Voce), Paper Based Examination (Narrative form)
Comb. 19 Oral Examination (Viva-Voce), Paper Based Examination (Multiple choice)
Employment History and Qualification Review
Comb. 20 Oral Examination (Viva-Voce), Paper Based Examination (Multiple choice)
Comb. 21 Oral Examination (Viva-Voce), Employment History and Qualification Review
Table 13: Combinations of assurance techniques for Individual Competences
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Appendix E: Cost-Effectiveness Calculations
Cost-effectiveness was defined in this study as a metric that expresses the relative cost and effectiveness of an
assurance technique and depended on whether it was aiming to assure security controls and individual competences as
follows:
• Assurance Techniques for Security Controls
Data for the calculation of cost-effectiveness is based on information requested via the on-line survey, i.e., respondents’
confidence in input (high, medium, low), and perceived effectiveness (excellent, very good, good, fair, poor) and
cost (extremely expensive, very expensive, expensive, moderate, cheap) of the assurance technique. The mapping of
qualitative values to quantitative ones is made using the following assignments:
• Confidence = {(high = 1), (medium = 0.5), (low = 0.1)}
• Effectiveness = {(excellent = 1), (very good = 0.8), (good = 0.6), (fair = 0.4), (poor = 0.2)}
• Cost = {(extremely expensive = 1), (very expensive = 0.8), (expensive = 0.6), (moderate = 0.4), (cheap = 0.2)}
Based on this, the following formula to calculate the cost-effectiveness of an assurance technique (AT) is:
Cost-EffectivenessAT = Overall EffectivenessAT × (1−Overall CostAT )
In the above mentioned formula, for the calculation of the overall effectiveness, it is required to calculate the frequency
of variables value, i.e., obtain counts on a single variable’s values. This results in the calculation of percentage values for
all single variable’s values in the range of [0,1]. Since the cost for each assurance activity is considered to be inversely
proportional to its overall effectiveness, we subtract cost from 1 (all values are expressed in [0,1]). With VP we refer to
“Valid Percentage” that does not include missing cases, and is analysed as V Pvalue =
Value Occurrences
Total number of values , V P ∈ [0, 1].
In addition, we have that:
ConfidenceAT = (1× V Phigh + 0.5× V Pmedium + 0.1× V Plow)
Overall EffectivenessAT = ConfidenceAT×(1×V Pexcellent+0.8×V Pvery good+0.6×V Pgood+0.4×V Pfair+0.2×V Ppoor)
, and,
Overall CostAT = ConfidenceAT × (1 × V Pextremely expensive + 0.8 × V Pvery expensive + 0.6 × V Pexpensive + 0.4 ×
V Pmoderate + 0.2× V Pcheap)
The following table provides detailed information on the calculated values of variables for all the examined assurance
techniques for security controls:
Review	  of	  policies	  (72) Review	  Client	  forms	  (64) Arctitectural	  review	  (64) Configuration	  review	  (57) Source	  code	  review	  (49)
Excellent 1.000 0.056 0.031 0.063 0.018 0.061
Fair 0.400 0.292 0.344 0.078 0.263 0.102
Good 0.600 0.458 0.328 0.438 0.456 0.490
Poor 0.200 0.014 0.266 0.016 0.102
Very	  good 0.800 0.180 0.031 0.406 0.263 0.245
Confidence 0.762 0.594 0.813 0.675 0.600
Overal	  Effectiveness 0.453 0.263 0.557 0.410 0.367
Cheap 0.200 0.167 0.594 0.094 0.105 0.041
Expensive 0.600 0.139 0.047 0.281 0.211 0.286
Extr.	  Expensive 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.184
Moderate 0.400 0.694 0.359 0.578 0.667 0.286
Very	  Expensive 0.800 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.018 0.204
Overal	  Cost 0.300 0.173 0.371 0.290 0.385
Cost	  effectiveness 0.317 0.218 0.350 0.291 0.226
Social	  engineering	  (40) Threat	  assessment	  (54) Static	  analysis	  (30) Dynamic	  analysis	  (29) Fuzzing	  (27)
Excellent 1.000 0.075 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fair 0.400 0.325 0.167 0.467 0.517 0.519
Good 0.600 0.375 0.463 0.300 0.310 0.222
Poor 0.200 0.075 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.037
Very	  good 0.800 0.150 0.333 0.200 0.172 0.222
Confidence 0.575 0.735 0.397 0.424 0.392
Overal	  Effectiveness 0.325 0.476 0.211 0.225 0.206
Cheap 0.200 0.200 0.111 0.100 0.103 0.074
Expensive 0.600 0.225 0.278 0.233 0.345 0.148
Extr.	  Expensive 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037
Moderate 0.400 0.550 0.574 0.633 0.552 0.667
Very	  Expensive 0.800 0.025 0.037 0.033 0.000 0.074
Overal	  Cost 0.239 0.330 0.174 0.190 0.183
Cost	  effectiveness 0.247 0.319 0.175 0.182 0.168
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Observation	  (41) Interview	  (55) Red	  team	  exercise	  (42) Penetration	  testing	  (56) Vulnerability	  scan	  (55)
Excellent 1.000 0.024 0.036 0.167 0.125 0.055
Fair 0.400 0.439 0.273 0.048 0.054 0.236
Good 0.600 0.317 0.327 0.381 0.321 0.345
Poor 0.200 0.000 0.055 0.048 0.000 0.036
Very	  good 0.800 0.220 0.309 0.357 0.500 0.327
Confidence 0.573 0.713 0.674 0.782 0.725
Overal	  Effectiveness 0.324 0.427 0.479 0.578 0.453
Cheap 0.200 0.195 0.164 0.048 0.018 0.491
Expensive 0.600 0.171 0.255 0.524 0.518 0.200
Extr.	  Expensive 1.000 0.000 0.018 0.024 0.018 0.000
Moderate 0.400 0.634 0.545 0.238 0.339 0.291
Very	  Expensive 0.800 0.000 0.018 0.167 0.107 0.018
Overal	  Cost 0.227 0.311 0.389 0.433 0.253
Cost	  effectiveness 0.251 0.295 0.293 0.328 0.339
Formal	  verification	  (32) Cryptogtaphic	  validation	  (31) Emanation	  security	  analysis	  (26) Witnessed	  test	  (30) Public	  review	  (26)
Excellent 1.000 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.033 0.038
Fair 0.400 0.281 0.226 0.385 0.267 0.385
Good 0.600 0.375 0.452 0.385 0.400 0.269
Poor 0.200 0.031 0.000 0.077 0.100 0.192
Very	  good 0.800 0.313 0.258 0.154 0.200 0.115
Confidence 0.594 0.510 0.419 0.594 0.354
Overal	  Effectiveness 0.353 0.323 0.219 0.332 0.171
Cheap 0.200 0.000 0.065 0.077 0.133 0.423
Expensive 0.600 0.219 0.290 0.308 0.400 0.154
Extr.	  Expensive 1.000 0.219 0.129 0.038 0.000 0.038
Moderate 0.400 0.313 0.258 0.346 0.367 0.308
Very	  Expensive 0.800 0.250 0.258 0.231 0.100 0.077
Overal	  Cost 0.401 0.319 0.235 0.293 0.142
Cost	  effectiveness 0.211 0.220 0.168 0.235 0.147
The following tables provide detailed information on the calculated values of variables for all the identified combinations
of assurance techniques (described in Appendix D:Combinations of Assurance Techniques):
Comb.	  1 Comb.	  2 Comb.	  3 Comb.	  4 Comb.	  5 Comb.	  6 Comb.	  7 Comb.	  8
Cost	  
effectiveness 0.317 0.251 0.293 0.328 0.339 0.226 0.175 0.182




















0.350 0.557 Architectural	  Review X X X




0.182 0.225 Dynamic	  Analysis X
0.168 0.219 Emanation	  Analysis
0.211 0.353 Formal	  Verification
0.168 0.206 Fuzzing X X
0.295 0.427 Interviews X X
0.251 0.324 Observation X
0.328 0.578 Penetration	  Tests X X
0.147 0.171 Public	  Review











X X X X
0.247 0.325 Social	  Engineering
0.226 0.367 Source	  Code	  Review X
0.175 0.211 Static	  Analysis X X
0.319 0.476 Threat	  Assessment
0.339 0.453 Vulnerability	  Scans X X
0.235 0.332 Witnessed	  Test X
Effectiness	  of	  combination 0.017 0.021 0.057 0.066 0.060 0.014 0.005 0.004
Cost	  effectiveness	  of	  combination 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.012 0.011 0.004 0.002 0.001
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Comb.	  9 Comb.	  10 Comb.	  11 Comb.	  12 Comb.	  13 Comb.	  14 Comb.	  15 Comb.	  16
Cost	  
effectiveness 0.247 0.350 0.319 0.211 0.220 0.168 0.235 0.147

















0.350 0.557 Architectural	  Review X X X




0.182 0.225 Dynamic	  Analysis
0.168 0.219 Emanation	  Analysis
0.211 0.353 Formal	  Verification X
0.168 0.206 Fuzzing
0.295 0.427 Interviews X X X
0.251 0.324 Observation X X X
0.328 0.578 Penetration	  Tests X X
0.147 0.171 Public	  Review










X X X X X X
0.247 0.325 Social	  Engineering
0.226 0.367 Source	  Code	  Review X X
0.175 0.211 Static	  Analysis
0.319 0.476 Threat	  Assessment X
0.339 0.453 Vulnerability	  Scans X
0.235 0.332 Witnessed	  Test
Effectiness	  of	  combination 0.021 0.060 0.051 0.033 0.021 0.032 0.021 0.009
Cost	  effectiveness	  of	  combination 0.006 0.011 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.003
• Assurance Techniques for Individual Competences
For the calculation of cost-effectiveness of individuals’ competencies we use the following formula, which simply
expresses that based on the perceived overall cost-effectiveness information provided by responders. Thus, we have
that:
Cost-Effectivenesscompetency = Overal Cost-Effectivenessexpert knowledge
Similarly to the calculation of assurance activities, we express the perceived cost-effectiveness as:
CostEffectivenesscompetency = (1× V Pexcellent + 0.8× V Pvery good + 0.6× V Pgood + 0.4× V Pfair + 0.2× V Ppoor)
The following table provides detailed information on the calculated values of variables for all the examined assurance
techniques for individual competences:
Virtual	  Lab	  Examination	  (74) Oral	  Examination	  (Viva-­‐Voce)	  (93) Paper	  Based	  Examination	  (Narrative	  form)	  (92)
Excellent 1.000 0.068 0.140 0.022
Fair 0.400 0.216 0.151 0.239
Good 0.600 0.378 0.323 0.359
Poor 0.200 0.081 0.043 0.054
Very	  good 0.800 0.257 0.344 0.326
Confidence 1.000 1.000 1.000
Cost	  effectiveness 0.603 0.678 0.605
Paper	  Based	  Examination	  (Multiple	  choice)	  (97) Employment	  History	  and	  Qualification	  Review	  (100)
Excellent 1.000 0.010 0.110
Fair 0.400 0.278 0.150
Good 0.600 0.381 0.290
Poor 0.200 0.165 0.060
Very	  good 0.800 0.165 0.390
Confidence 1.000 1.000
Cost	  effectiveness 0.515 0.668
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